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INTRODUCTION
The wave of corporate scandals that began with Enron in 2001, and
another wave of scandals associated with the financial meltdown of 2008,
brought with them demands for more regulation of corporate governance.1
∗ Professor, Widener University School of Law. A.B., Cornell; J.D., Harvard; LL.M.,
Georgetown. The author would like to thank Roger Dennis, Arthur Fox, Jeff Gordon, Larry
Hamermesh, Paul Regan, and Andy Strauss for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. Post-Enron reforms included the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107204, 116 Stat. 745-810 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.
(2013), new SEC regulations, and changes in stock exchange listing standards. By middecade a backlash had set in. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Too Many Bells? Too Many
Whistles? Corporate Governance in the Post-Enron, Post-WorldCom Era, 58 S.C.L. REV.
65, 66 (2006) (discussing Sarbanes-Oxley and noting that “[w]hen the pendulum swings, it
swings too far.”); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1602 (2005) (noting that the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act’s substantive mandates “were seriously ill-conceived”). Then, the financial meltdown
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This led to renewed debates over the optimal allocation of power within
public corporations among their shareholders, boards of directors,
management, and with respect to other stakeholders.2 One of the liveliest
of those debates has been over the value of shareholder democracy as a
means to improve corporate performance and reduce the likelihood of
future Enrons or Lehman Brothers.3 The theory is that by expanding the
role of shareholders in selecting corporate boards and influencing corporate
policy, shareholders, as the owners of the corporation, 4 will be in a better
position to monitor the performance of directors who may be asleep at the
switch, and of managers who may be pursuing their own agendas at the
expense of the shareholders.
The debate over shareholder democracy as a means to improve
performance and curb wrongdoing, or even as an end in itself,5 has perhaps
naturally led scholars to compare corporate governance and public
government.
Scholars have explored public financing of election

reenergized reform efforts, leading to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376-2223 (2010) (codified as amended in
scattered sections and titles of U.S.C.), more SEC regulations, and a renewed focus on the
relationship between corporate governance and corporate failure and malfeasance. See, e.g.,
Symposium, Corporate Governance After the Financial Crisis, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 171,
178-80 (2010) (discussing the potential impact of corporate governance legislation).
2. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 249 (1999) (advocating for team production theory);
Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1043, 104445 (2008) (arguing in support of stakeholder governance).
3. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1758 (2006) (suggesting divisions between
ownership and control are beneficial); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 836 (2005) (arguing for shareholder
empowerment); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 728 (2010) (suggesting limited effectiveness of
shareholder empowerment); Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder
Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 106 (2008) (arguing shareholder and stakeholder interests
can align); Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV.
789, 790-91 (2007) (advocating board governance over shareholder governance). For an
argument that the debate over shareholder democracy is more about rhetoric than reality, see
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics 94 B.U. L.
REV. 1997 (2014) (arguing that corporate governance debates are largely symbolic).
4. Closely related to the shareholder democracy debate is the question whether it is
either accurate or useful to characterize shareholders as the “owners” of the corporation.
See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 37-38 (2012) (arguing
shareholders contract with corporations, but do not own them).
5. James McConvill, Shareholder Empowerment as an End in Itself: A New
Perspective on Allocation of Power in the Modern Corporation, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1013,
1015 (2007).
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campaigns as a model for director elections in public corporations,6 and
have compared the relationship between one-share one-vote principles in
corporate law and one-person one-vote principles in public elections.7 One
scholar, who explored similarities between corporate boards and the
presidential Electoral College, noted that such comparisons are
“intellectually tempting,” but concluded they “ultimately falter because
participation in a corporation fundamentally differs from participation in a
nation.” 8
Some commentators have expressed concern that the parallels
between corporate and public governance can be misleading because they
sometimes enhance the credibility of capital markets and the public’s
confidence in them. 9 Of course, during periods of partisan gridlock in
Washington and record low poll numbers for Congress, comparisons with
public government can just as likely undermine an institution’s image as
enhance it.
This article explores corporate governance through a different
comparison, between corporations and their sometime adversaries across
bargaining tables and picket lines––labor unions. The article compares the
regulation of corporate governance and the regulation of the internal affairs
of unions, and the rights of shareholders and union members in each of
these two regulatory models.
Since long before Enron, in the parallel universe of union governance,
the democratic rights of union members have been protected by the
Labor—Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA, or
6. Lee Harris, Shareholder Campaign Funds: A Campaign Subsidy Scheme for
Corporate Elections, 58 UCLA L. REV. 167, 218-19 (2010).
7. Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from the
History of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1350-51 (2006);
Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of
Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 450-63 (2008).
8. Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy,
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1390, 1393-97 (2006). As one court famously put it when
upholding SEC proxy regulations:
Appellants’ fundamental complaint appears to be that stockholder disputes
should be viewed in the eyes of the law just as are political contests, with each
side free to hurl charges with comparative unrestraint, the assumption being that
the opposing side is then at liberty to refute and thus effectively deflate the
‘campaign oratory’ of its adversary. Such, however, was not the policy of
Congress as enacted in the Securities Exchange Act.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. May, 229 F.2d 123, 124 (2d Cir. 1956).
9. See, e.g., Thomas W. Joo, Comment, Corporate Governance and the “D-Word”,
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1579, 1586-88 (2006) (arguing that to describe corporate
governance as democratic is problematic); cf. Cary Coglianese, Legitimacy and Corporate
Governance, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 159 (2007) (discussing common but possibly misleading
elements between governments and corporations).
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Landrum-Griffin Act). 10 In the 1950’s, when American unions were at
their peak, the labor movement was rocked by public scandals and
congressional investigations into union corruption and labor racketeering
that were every bit as big a story then as the corporate scandals of recent
years. In terms of galvanizing public attention on the need for reform, the
prosecutions of Enron executives, or even Martha Stewart, did not hold a
candle to the larger than life confrontations between Teamsters President
Jimmy Hoffa and committee counsel––and future Attorney General and
Senator––Robert F. Kennedy during televised hearings of the U.S. Senate’s
Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management
Field (the McClellan Committee). 11 The LMRDA was passed in the
aftermath of those scandals and the congressional investigations that
exposed them. 12
The LMRDA combined various approaches to the reform of unions
that resemble both some traditional corporate law remedies and some more
recent strategies for reforming corporate governance. These included new
requirements that unions and their officers file financial and other reports;13
a cause of action against union officials for fiduciary breaches;14 protection
against retaliation for members seeking to reform their unions; 15 and most
significant, new guarantees of internal union democracy. 16 These would
enable members to clean up their unions for themselves, avoiding the need
for heavy-handed government interventions into internal union affairs. The
LMRDA is supplemented by another judicially created union member
cause of action against unions for breaches of the duty of fair

10. Labor–Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73
Stat. 519 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2013)). Specifically, 29 U.S.C. §§
411(a)(1), 481 protect democratic voting rights for union members.
11. The Committee held 270 days of hearings over a two-year period. JANICE R.
BELLACE & ALAN D. BERKOWITZ, THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT: TWENTY YEARS OF FEDERAL
PROTECTION OF UNION MEMBERS’ RIGHTS 3 (1979).
12. Legislation to ensure union democracy and achieve other reforms was
recommended by the McClellan Committee, S. REP. NO. 85-1417, at 450-53 (1958) (Interim
Rep.), although proposals for the federal regulation of internal union affairs had been
circulating since at least 1935. See Michael J. Goldberg, An Overview and Assessment of
the Law Regulating Internal Union Affairs, 21 J. LAB. RES. 15, 17 (2000) (chronicling
history of internal union affairs regulation).
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 431-40.
14. Id. § 501(b).
15. Id. §§ 412, 529.
16. Id. §§ 411, 481 (protecting members’ freedom of speech, rights to equal treatment,
due process, and opportunities to attend and participate in union membership meetings, and
rights to run for office, nominate candidates, and vote in regular and fair elections of union
officers).
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representation (DFR), 17 which unions owe their members when negotiating
and enforcing collective bargaining agreements.18
This article, then, is an exercise of comparative legal scholarship. But
instead of comparing the laws of different nations, it examines distinct
bodies of law within one nation that seek to achieve often similar goals in
the context of regulating two different types of organizations, each
important to the nation’s economic and political well-being. The article
compares these parallel regimes for regulating the governance of publicly
traded corporations on the one hand and labor unions on the other.19 It also
17. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1967); Clyde W. Summers, The
Individual Employee’s Rights Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement: What
Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 252 (1977) (discussing the duty
of fair representation).
18. In extreme cases of union corruption involving organized crime, LMRDA and DFR
remedies are supplemented by powerful structural injunctions available under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-3
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2013)). See JAMES B. JACOBS, MOBSTERS, UNIONS, AND
FEDS: THE MAFIA AND THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 138-253 (2006) (providing
examples of RICO use against labor unions); Michael J. Goldberg, Cleaning Labor’s House:
Institutional Reform Litigation in the Labor Movement, 1989 DUKE L.J. 903, 946-83, 9941010 (highlighting instances of RICO use against labor unions).
19. The corporate focus of this article is exclusively on publically traded corporations;
it does not consider the governance of closely held corporations. Also beyond the scope of
this article, although I would be remiss if I did not at least mention them in this comparison
of union governance and corporate governance, are several ways in which unions can
impact or participate in corporate governance. See generally Marleen O’Connor, Labor’s
Role in the American Corporate Governance Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 97
(2000) (exploring why American workers do not have corporate governance rights while
pension funds do). First, while it is much less common in this country than in Germany and
some other countries, unions are occasionally given seats directly on corporate boards of
directors. See, e.g., Agence France-Presse, UAW Gets Seat on Chrysler Board, INDUS. WK.
(June 15, 2012), http://www.industryweek.com/public-policy/uaw-gets-seat-chrysler-board
(reporting appointment of a United Automobile Workers’ representative to Chrysler’s board
of directors). Second, unions and collectively bargained pension funds are important
institutional investors, and it is common for them to engage in shareholder activism. See
generally Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance:
Shareholder Activism By Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018 (1998) (discussing the
power that unions have in influencing corporate governance). Finally, unions have a strong
interest in the success of the corporations with which they bargain. They can serve as
watchdogs against corporate waste, and in many ways have interests that overlap with those
of shareholders. For example, where unions are able to obtain wage and benefit increases,
they have incentives to help the corporation remain competitive by achieving efficiencies in
other areas. It may be no coincidence that in unionized companies, excesses in executive
compensation are less of a problem then in nonunion firms. See Rafael Gomez &
Konstantinos Tzioumis, Unions and Executive Compensation 2 (Centre for Economic
Performance, Discussion Paper No. 720 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1032796 (finding union presence lowers executive compensation).
For previous work comparing corporate and union governance, see JOHN T. DUNLOP, THE
MANAGEMENT OF LABOR UNIONS 3-8 (1990) (examining decision-making processes in
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examines how the nature of democratic governance can vary in different
contexts, depending on whether it is valued simply as a tool for achieving
good governance, or also as an end in itself.
Section I of this article considers just how similar, and dissimilar,
unions and corporations are to each other because it is important not to
overstate their parallels. Section II then focuses on several key elements of
shareholder and union democracy: the nomination and election of
corporate board members and union officers, and shareholder and union
member rights to make proposals, campaign for them or for candidates they
support, and vote. Section III examines shareholder and union member
litigation, with a particular focus on derivative actions. Section IV draws
some lessons from these comparisons and offers some thoughts on the
themes of democracy in the regulation of corporate and union governance.
Further, Section IV contrasts their instrumental and normative values, and
concludes that while the instrumental arguments for and against more
democracy in union and corporate governance are quite similar, the
normative arguments are much more central to the cause of union
democracy.
I.

APPLES AND APPLES, OR APPLES AND ORANGES?

This article makes no argument for importing union democracy
principles or practices into the law of corporate governance, or vice versa.
Nevertheless, cross-fertilization of ideas is one of the benefits of
comparative scholarship, so it is important to know whether one is crossing
one variety of apples with another, or working with different types of fruit
altogether.
There are major differences in the purpose and nature of corporations
and unions that may require different approaches to their governance and
reform. A central purpose of unions, for example, is to give employees a
voice—the voice of collective bargaining—in their workplaces. Also
important, although not formally acknowledged in labor law, are the social
and political roles unions play in our pluralistic civil society. They provide
a collective voice for workers not only on the job, but in larger social and
organizations); DONALD MARTIN, AN OWNERSHIP THEORY OF THE TRADE UNION (1980)
(discussing the different conceptual models of ownership in unions); Daniel R. Fischel,
Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared with Capital Markets and Corporate Law, 51 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1061 (1984) (comparing labor and corporate interests); Bruce A. Herzfelder &
Elizabeth E. Schriever, The Union Judgment Rule, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 980 (1987) (arguing
for judicial deference to the decisions of union officials similar to the business judgment
rule in corporate law); Stewart J. Schwab, Union Raids, Union Democracy, and the Market
for Union Control, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 367, 368 (comparing union member and corporate
shareholder relationships with management).
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political arenas as well. 20 Those representative functions may justify
placing a higher priority on union democracy than on shareholder
democracy, 21 since corporations generally do not purport to represent
shareholders for any other purpose than to maximize returns on their
investments. 22
Another important difference between unions and corporations that
has policy implications for governance reform is the role of exit and voice
as means by which dissatisfied members or shareholders can act on their
dissatisfaction. 23 For most shareholders of publicly traded corporations,
exit simply means selling one’s stock in the company. For the majority of
union members, on the other hand, exit is usually not a viable alternative. 24
One obvious form of exit for disgruntled members is simply to resign
from the union. In roughly half of the states, however—other than the socalled “right-to-work” states 25—those employees would still have to pay

20. See generally CLAYTON SINYAI, SCHOOLS OF DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL HISTORY
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (2006) (exploring the similarities between labor
unions and democracy, which both bestow power to members of larger groups); Paul
Johnston, Organize for What? The Resurgence of Labor as a Citizenship Movement, in
REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT: LABOR’S QUEST FOR RELEVANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 27
(arguing that unions attempt to achieve the same goals as citizenship) (Lowell Turner, Harry
C. Katz & Richard W. Hurd eds., 2001); MICHAEL D. YATES, WHY UNIONS MATTER (2d ed.
2009) (detailing both the positive and negative impacts of unions on America); Barbara J.
Fick, Not Just Collective Bargaining: The Role of Trade Unions in Creating and
Maintaining a Democratic Society, 12 WORKINGUSA: J. LAB. & SOC’Y 249 (2009)
(explaining that advocates for democracy should support unions because of union’s strong
contributions to democratic principles); Thomas C. Kohler, Civic Virtues at Work: Unions
as the Seedbeds of the Civic Virtues, 36 B.C. L. REV. 279 (1995) (arguing that the
ambivalence towards unions is unwarranted because of their positive democratic attributes).
21. See Clyde W. Summers, The Public Interest in Union Democracy, 53 NW. U. L.
REV. 610, 624 (1958) (detailing the advantages that shareholders have over union members).
22. Corporations, of course, also participate in the political process, at least for
purposes of influencing the regulatory and tax climates in which they operate.
Opportunities for corporate participation in politics are more expansive than ever in the
aftermath of Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), which lifted
restrictions on corporate political contributions.
23. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970)
(explaining that dissatisfied members of an organization or polity can act on their
dissatisfaction by exiting the relationship, or by asserting their voices within it).
24. Difficulty of exit also can distinguish unions from other types of nonprofit and
voluntary organizations. See generally Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice, and Exit: The
Constitutional Bounds of the Right of Association, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 821 (2002)
(discussing different options of exit in voluntary organizations).
25. These are states that have exercised their option under the Taft-Hartley Act, 29
U.S.C. § 164(b) (2013), to outlaw provisions in collective bargaining agreements
compelling nonmembers in a unionized bargaining unit to join the union or, as nonmembers,
pay agency fees in lieu of dues.
OF THE
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some portion of the union’s dues as a fee for representation by the union. 26
And in unionized workplaces anywhere, including right-to-work states, the
employees’ terms of employment would still be governed by the collective
bargaining agreements negotiated by the incumbent unions, pursuant to the
doctrine of exclusive representation. 27 Thus, resigning from membership
might save the employee some money, but it would also likely weaken the
union as an institution, which might be a goal of employees who oppose
unions on principle, but not for those who simply seek free-rider status,
enjoying the benefits of union representation without paying for them.
More importantly for our purposes, it would leave the former member
disenfranchised, unable to vote on collective bargaining agreements or on
the union officers who negotiate them and handle grievances arising under
them. 28
Another form of exit is voting the union out of the workplace
altogether through a decertification vote conducted by the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB). 29 That cannot work; however, unless a majority
of the workers in the unit agree with that goal. Sometimes, the NLRB’s
ballot will present three choices:
keeping the incumbent union;
decertifying that union and proceeding “union free;” or certifying a
different union as the bargaining agent. 30 Where the moving force is a rival
union, this might be considered the labor law equivalent of a hostile
takeover, 31 but because many national unions are bound by American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations’ (AFL-CIO)

26. See Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 751 (1988) (holding that
unions are allowed collection from nonmembers to prevent free-riders). Union expenses
related to collective bargaining and contract enforcement are considered “chargeable” as
agency fees, but political or ideologically motivated expenditures are not. See Ellis v. Bhd.
of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 453 (1984) (holding that the union could not
charge nonmembers for litigation that was not connected to bargaining). For at least some
public sector employees, however, agency fees may be constitutionally suspect pursuant to
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2641 (2014)
(holding that Illinois’ law mandating union fees for nonmember personal health assistants
violated the First Amendment).
27. See infra text accompanying note 43.
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (2013) (equal voting rights for “[e]very member of a
labor organization . . . .”) (emphasis added).
29. See Section 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)
(2013). State or local labor relations agencies conduct these votes for public employees, and
the Federal Labor Relations Authority conducts them for federal employees.
30. See, e.g., Janice R. Bellace, Union Decertification under the NLRA, 57 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 643, 644 (1981) (discussing types of decertification).
31. See, e.g., Schwab, supra note 19, at 386 (discussing the costs and benefits of taking
over a union as opposed to starting a new union, and emphasizing that taking over a union
might have greater benefits).
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no raiding pacts, 32 there may be no alternatives available other than weak,
independent unions. For these reasons, Professor Schwab’s comparison of
“the market for union control” with the market for corporate control
concludes that the market is significantly less effective in the union
context. 33
The most literal form of exit for dissatisfied union members is to leave
their jobs and trade them in for others where there is better union
representation or no representation, if that is the preference. The problem
is that even in a good economy it is often difficult to find a new job with
comparable wages and benefits. 34 This is particularly true for workers who
are older, 35 have skills that are industry or job specific, or are tied down
geographically. Needless to say, prospects for greener pastures are
severely diminished during economic downturns. Put another way, a union
member’s investment in a particular job, and the union that comes with it,
is typically a huge one relative to the member’s other assets. It is an
investment of human capital that is not liquid and is nearly impossible to
diversify. Quitting one’s job, therefore, should be an option of last resort.
Thus, for many members who are dissatisfied with the quality of their
unions’ representation, it is not exit from the union but a voice inside it that
can provide the means to improve their situation.36
32. Cf. Lea Vaughn, Article XX of the AFL-CIO Constitution: Managing and
Resolving Inter-Union Disputes, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1990) (explaining the history and
procedures for Article XX of the AFL-CIO Constitution, which prevents raiding).
Additionally, Federal antitrust laws do not apply to unions. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2013).
33. Schwab, supra note 19, at 414-16. Other factors weakening the market for union
control include the election, certification, and contract bar rules under the National Labor
Relations Act, all of which limit the frequency of potential decertification votes. Schwab,
supra note 19, at 411.
34. Before the Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119-1025 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections and titles of U.S.C.), if an otherwise more
desirable job did not come with health insurance, pre-existing conditions could discourage
switching because of difficulty obtaining coverage. Portability issues with defined benefit
pension plans pose similar disincentives for changing jobs. Although the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as
amended in scattered sections and titles of U.S.C.) requires private sector pensions to vest
after three years, the combined proceeds of, for example, three pensions covering eight
years of service each can be far less than the proceeds of a single pension covering the same
twenty-four years.
35. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat.
602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2013)), is generally more useful in
protecting a job one already has than in obtaining a job one does not have.
36. See generally HERMAN BENSON, REBELS, REFORMERS, AND RACKETEERS: HOW
INSURGENTS TRANSFORMED THE LABOR MOVEMENT (2005) (describing reformers’ efforts to
pursue more democracy and better representation inside their unions); MIKE PARKER &
MARTHA GRUELLE, DEMOCRACY IS POWER: REBUILDING UNIONS FROM THE BOTTOM UP
(1999) (arguing that membership control is essential for strong unions).
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On the other hand, the most common exit strategy for shareholders in
large, public corporations is to sell their shares under the so-called “Wall
Street Rule” 37 when they are dissatisfied with corporate performance.
Withdrawing money from one company and investing in another is usually
an easy and low cost transaction. The alternative of using shareholder
voice to improve the corporation––by electing new directors, proposing
resolutions, waging proxy fights, or bringing shareholder suits––is usually
too expensive, too slow, or too much of a long shot to pursue.
Moreover, unlike union members, who have most if not all of their
employment eggs in one basket, corporate shareholders, at least outside of
close corporations, typically diversify their investments, thereby reducing
their risks and making exit easier.38
Nevertheless, the parallels between unions and corporations remain
substantial. Even in public corporations exit is not always a viable
alternative. This is particularly true for institutional investors, but can be
true of any shareholders, especially those with substantial holdings,
depending on a variety of factors related to the tax consequences of selling
and whether share value is up or down at any particular time. 39
Moreover, both unions and public corporations have a major impact
on the nation’s economic health and political climate. Both are forms of
organization that have been officially sanctioned and granted significant
rights and powers by the state. This gives government more of a
justification for regulating the internal affairs of these otherwise private
entities. Corporations, of course, have traditionally been viewed as
artificial “persons” whose very existence and authority to act on behalf of
their shareholders is a result of corporate charters issued by the states.40
The insulation from personal liability and the ability to raise capital that the

37. As Professor Bainbridge explains the rule, “it’s easier to switch than fight.”
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Redirecting State Takeover Laws at Proxy Contests, 1992 WIS. L.
REV. 1071, 1080.
38. For shareholders of close corporations, like union members, exit is often difficult.
These shareholders typically have a greater portion of their assets invested in the business
than shareholders of public companies, and there may be no ready market if they wish to
cash out their investments. Moreover, the shareholders are often employees of the business
as well as part owners, making exit even more complicated. Robert C. Art, Shareholder
Rights and Remedies in Close Corporations: Oppression, Fiduciary Duties, and
Reasonable Expectations, 28 J. CORP. L. 371, 384 (2003).
39. See LISA M. FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A PRIMER ON SHAREHOLDER
ACTIVISM AND PARTICIPATION 31-32 (2011) (explaining why it is not always possible to exit
a publicly traded corporation); see also, Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder
Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 716 (2007) (noting that selling shares at a low price “is
hardly an adequate remedy” for poor board performance) (internal footnote omitted).
40. See 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 1:2 (3d ed. 2010) (defining the legal status of corporations).
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modern corporate form provides are significantly reduced when a corporate
charter disappears. 41
The government does not officially charter most unions, as
unincorporated associations; 42 however, many of their powers are derived
from federal law or from state law for unions representing state or
municipal employees. For example, a union selected by a majority of the
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit is granted by the National
Labor Relations Act exclusive bargaining rights for all the employees in
that unit, not just those who voted for or joined the union.43 The same
statute protects employees interested in joining or organizing unions from
employer interference, restraint, or coercion regarding, or discrimination in
response to, the exercise of their rights to “bargain collectively . . . and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection.” 44 In addition, a union’s right to strike––
its greatest source of leverage at the bargaining table––is expressly
protected in the private sector by federal law.45 Moreover, unions share
with corporations three of the four “distinctive legal features of the
corporate form: (1) centralized management and right of control; (2)
limited liability; [and] (3) separate legal personality.” 46

41. See id. at § 1:5 (noting that “[a] primary advantage of the [corporate form] is the
shareholders’ limited liability.”). Limited liability is also available through entities like
limited liability companies. Id.
42. One exception is the Oregon Public Employees Union, Service Employees
International Union (SEIU) Local 503, a non-profit corporation. See DiNicola v. Serv.
Emp. Int’l Union Local 503, No. 12C18681 (Or. Cir. Ct. Marion Cnty. Ct. June 27, 2013),
http://media.oregonlive.com/mapes/other/Judge%20Graves%20Order%20Dated%20June%
2026.pdf (identifying the union as a non-profit corporation in an order granting injunctive
relief).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2013).
44. Id. § 157 (2013); see also id. §§ 158(a)(1), (3) (2013) (protecting the rights
declared in § 157).
45. Id. § 163 (2013). Judicial and agency decisions interpreting the Act, however, have
significantly weakened these rights. See, e.g., ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE WORKERS’
LAW: HOW TO FIGHT THE ASSAULT ON LABOR RIGHTS 80-89 (2006) (describing cases where
courts have given employers the power circumvent striking workers); James Gray Pope,
How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518,
527-34 (2004) (discussing how NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. 304 U.S. 333, 345-46
(1938) allowed employers to permanently replace striking workers).
46. Schwab, supra note 19, at 405 (citing ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 2
(1986)). Limited liability for union members and a union’s separate legal personality were
established by the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act. The
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (2013)). As discussed, the fourth distinctive
feature, free transferability, i.e., exit, is not as readily available for union members. Schwab,
supra note 19, at 405.
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Executive officers and board members of both unions and
corporations serve, in a fiduciary capacity, the interests of large numbers of
individual members or shareholders. Both corporate and union leaders
need, and are assured, substantial discretion under the business judgment
rule in corporate law 47 or the duty of fair representation in labor law,48 to be
bold risk takers when the occasion calls for it, without fear of being second
guessed every step of the way by overly intrusive courts or administrative
agencies. Yet it is also true that both corporate and union leaders control
huge sums of money and other resources that are not theirs. In both cases,
the potential conflicts of interest are enormous, and temptations for
manipulation and abuse are often hard to resist. Thus, a fundamental focus
of corporate governance––the separation of ownership from control––is a
central concern of union governance as well.
Finally, both unions and corporations are governed through structures
that bring political dynamics into the foreground.49 Union members have
the right to elect their officers, vote on dues increases, and usually, to ratify
collective bargaining agreements. 50 Shareholders have the right to elect the
board members, who select and oversee senior corporate officers, and to
vote on fundamental corporate transactions. 51 Often, these votes in both
unions and corporations are sleepy, uncontested affairs, generating little
interest. 52 But sometimes they are hotly contested, involving rival slates of
candidates or factions of members or shareholders. Elections and votes in
both unions and corporations, therefore, raise similar issues regarding the
nomination of candidates or the making of proposals, ensuring that voting
is conducted in a fair manner, giving interested parties opportunities to
campaign, providing access to information, some modicum of free speech
to discuss candidates and issues, and protection against retaliation from
incumbents who might favor a particular outcome. These are some of the
topics that will be addressed in the next section of this article.

47. See generally Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000
WISC. L. REV. 573 (explaining the rationale of the business judgment rule).
48. See generally WILLIAM W. OSBORNE, JR., ED., LABOR UNION LAW AND
REGULATION 277-420 (2003) (explaining the duty of fair representation).
49. See Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at 323 (discussing “the fundamentally political
nature of the corporation” and “the use of political tools” in corporate governance).
50. See infra text accompanying note 110 (discussing the discretion unions have to
determine the matters on which they vote).
51. FAIRFAX, supra note 39, at 12-16.
52. See Bebchuk, supra note 39, at 732 (noting that in corporations, “[e]lectoral
challenges are rare, and the risk of replacement via a proxy contest is extremely low”).
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RIGHTS TO NOMINATE, PROPOSE, CAMPAIGN, AND VOTE

A. The Nomination and Election of Board Members and Officers
No one would confuse the governance of large corporations or unions
with the direct democracy of a New England town meeting. Instead, the
governance of corporations and unions takes the form of representative
democracies, where the shareholders or members, whose interests those
institutions are intended to promote, vote for the top leaders of those
entities, or at least for the people who select them. But as this section
explores, voting for candidates is one thing, while getting them on the
ballot is quite another.
The differences between corporations and unions in this area are
significant, as are variations among unions themselves. The election rights
of union members exceed those of shareholders in two respects: the
number and variety of offices for which elections are held, and the
membership’s opportunity to participate in the nomination process. On the
other hand, shareholders usually have the opportunity to vote at more
frequent intervals, and when they do, they vote directly (although often
through proxies) for the candidates in question. This differs from union
members, who, rather than voting directly for candidates, can sometimes
vote only for convention delegates who in turn elect officers.
Most major American labor unions are organized on a national scale, 53
but they conduct much of their day-to-day work through local and regional
Each union entity, from local to
unions they have chartered. 54
international, elects officers and board members whose terms and elections
are determined by the union’s constitution, and must be in compliance with
the LMRDA. 55 Unions are free to determine the number, titles, and
53. Michael J. Goldberg, Top Officers of Local Unions, 19 LAB. STUD. J. 3, 9 (1995)
(noting that most of the unions in a study of 298 local unions were affiliated with a national
or international union). Unions with Canadian affiliates often have the term “International”
in their names. Alan Hyde, Rights for Canadian Members of International Unions Under
the (U.S.) Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1007, 100810 (1986).
54. Locals typically represent workers in a single, often large, workplace, or in
multiple, often smaller, workplaces, within the same trade in a single city or region. Locals
can vary greatly in size. One survey of private sector locals revealed that 39.3 percent had
100 or fewer members, and 10.4 percent had 1,000 or more members, with some over
10,000. Goldberg, supra note 53, at 11.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (2013). The LMRDA does not regulate elections in labor
federations like the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO). Id. § 481(a). Perhaps this is because they generally do not engage in collective
bargaining with employers; it is the unions affiliated with them that do, and most of them
are regulated by the LMRDA. Unions that represent public employees exclusively are not
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responsibilities of their officers, but they cannot avoid LMRDA
requirements by mere labels if the positions in question meet the statutory
definition of “officer.” 56
The LMRDA requires all national unions to elect their officers at least
every five years. 57 These unions can decide for themselves whether the
elections will be conducted by direct secret ballot votes of the members, or
by the votes of delegates to union conventions, if those delegates are
themselves elected by the secret ballot votes of the members they
represent. 58 In contrast, local unions must elect their officers at least every
three years by the direct secret ballot votes of the members. 59 Intermediate
bodies must conduct their elections at least every four years, and as with
national unions, the voting can be done by members directly, or by
delegates they elect. 60 Most intermediate bodies use the delegate method.
This has raised concerns among union democracy advocates due to trends
in many unions, such as the Carpenters, to consolidate and transfer many
collective bargaining functions previously handled by locals, to regional
entities. The concern is not so much with consolidation itself, which may
be justified by efficiency and industry changes; rather, the concern is that
delegate elections move the selection of officers one step away from the
members, and place it in the hands of delegates who either may be

covered, but if any of their members work in the private sector, the LMRDA applies. Id. §§
402(e)(2),(i). Unions representing federal employees must in effect comply with the
LMRDA pursuant to the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat.
1111, 1210 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7120 (2013)), and Department of Labor
(DOL) regulations issued thereunder.
56. The statutory definition includes “any constitutional officer, any person authorized
to perform the functions of president, vice president, secretary, treasurer, or other executive
functions of a labor organization, and any member of its executive board or similar
governing body.” 29 U.S.C. § 402(n) (2013).
57. Id. § 481(a) (2013).
58. Id. Most national unions use the convention method. For years, the major
exceptions were the Mine Workers and Steelworkers. In 1991, the Teamsters joined their
ranks pursuant to a consent decree with federal prosecutors settling a civil RICO case
seeking to rid the union of its infiltration by organized crime. The theory, promoted by
union reformers, was that the members themselves, through direct elections, would be more
likely to “vote the rascals out” than convention delegates who could be more easily
pressured by an entrenched “old guard” or who might themselves be part of that old guard.
See generally Goldberg, supra note 18, at 997-98 (discussing the change in the Teamsters
election process to prevent improper influence from organized crime). A similar RICO
settlement later brought direct elections to the Laborers’ Union as well. See JACOBS, supra
note 18, at 221-27 (detailing the Laborers’ Union settlement with the DOJ that prompted
changes in their election process).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 481(b) (2013).
60. Id. § 481(d).
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pressured for their votes by entrenched incumbents, or may be part of an
entrenched power structure. 61
In contrast to union members, who vote directly or through elected
convention delegates for both the governing boards and the officers of their
unions, shareholders cannot vote for their corporations’ top executives. 62
Not even the most ardent supporters of corporate democracy support
shareholder elections of CEOs. 63 Rather, the only positions in corporate
governance chosen by shareholders are directors, who in turn select CEOs
and other top executives.
Corporation statutes of most states require annual shareholder
meetings at which members of the board are elected by shareholders on a
one-share, one-vote basis. 64 Since corporations are to be managed “by or
under the direction of” their boards,65 these annual shareholder votes have
61. The DOL, which enforces the LMRDA’s election provisions, and the courts, have
rejected reformers’ arguments that when collective bargaining functions traditionally
handled at the local level are taken over by intermediate entities, those intermediate bodies
should be treated as locals for purposes of election frequency and method. See Harrington
v. Chao, 372 F.3d 52, 59 (1st Cir. 2004) (emphasizing that unions have hierarchies, which
distinguishes the different duties and responsibilities at different levels in the hierarchy).
62. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.40(b) (2010). In Delaware, where the General
Corporation Law permits officers to be chosen in the manner prescribed in the bylaws, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(b) (2014), such votes are theoretically possible, but observers of
Delaware corporate practice who are much more knowledgeable than the author are
unaware of any Delaware corporations whose bylaws call for shareholder elections of
corporate officers. Interview with Professor Larry Hamermesh, Ruby R. Vale Professor of
Corporate and Business Law at Widener’s Institute of Delaware Corporate Law (Mar. 23,
2014).
63. However, some have called for periodic votes on the retention of CEOs, see Lee
Harris, CEO Retention, 24 FLA. L. REV. 1753, 1782-83, 1801-02 (2013), or for the election
of CEO’s by a variety of stakeholders, including not only shareholders but employees and
debt holders as well, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, On the Direct Election of CEOs, 32 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 261, 280 (2006).
64. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2014); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.03(c)
(2010) (describing the procedure through which stockholders elect directors, either through
annual meeting or written consent (requiring unanimity or that all directorships are vacant
and can be filled by this action)); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Director Nominations, 39 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 117, 120 (2014) (explaining that corporate statutes provide stockholders with the
right to vote for directors with one vote for each share of capital stock owned, unless the
articles of incorporation indicate otherwise). There are exceptions to the one-share one-vote
principle, and a variety of mechanisms for watering it down. See infra text accompanying
note 140 (providing voting trusts and vote buying as examples of mechanisms for watering
down a corporate vote).
65. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2014); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b)
(2010) (instructing that a corporation’s business and affairs must be managed by a board of
directors, unless otherwise specified in the certificate of incorporation). In reality, corporate
boards delegate most management authority to their companies’ officers, retaining for
themselves power to select senior executives, determine their compensation, monitor their
performance, and make major corporate decisions like responding to acquisition offers.
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been hailed as “the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of
directorial power rests.” 66 Most observers, however, recognize that the
shareholder franchise, as a center of corporate decision-making power, is,
in the words of Professor Bebchuk, “a myth.” 67 “In fact,” says Professor
Bainbridge, “shareholder control rights are so weak that they scarcely
qualify as part of corporate governance.” 68
There are a number of reasons why so many believe that the
shareholder franchise is a myth, but they add up to the same thing:
“[S]hareholders in public corporations do not in any realistic sense elect
boards. Rather, boards elect themselves.” 69 This is primarily because of
the solicitation and use of proxies for shareholder votes cast at annual
meetings. In the overwhelming majority of board elections, it is only the
incumbent board that solicits proxies for the election of directors, and the
solicitation is exclusively for candidates nominated by that board or its
True, shareholders can directly nominate
nominating committee.70
additional candidates from the floor of the annual meeting, 71 but it is
typically meaningless because proxies have already been collected, and
therefore, most votes have already been cast.72
Bebchuk, supra note 39, at 679-80.
66. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
67. Bebchuk, supra note 39, at 677.
68. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 569 (2003); see also CLARK, supra note 46, at 95
(specifying that shareholder voting is “a mere ceremony designed to give a veneer of
legitimacy to managerial power”).
69. Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at 311 (emphasis in the original).
70. From 1996 to 2005, only 118 board elections involved proxy solicitations on behalf
of challengers seeking to replace incumbent directors, outside the context of a sale or
takeover fight. Takeover fights added another eighty-eight proxy solicitations to the total.
Bebchuk, supra note 39, at 686. Another study pegs the frequency of contested director
elections at less than one percent. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of
Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1364 (2011).
71. Curiously, this right to nominate director candidates is not mentioned in state
corporation statutes, and while it is widely recognized, its legal foundation and
enforceability remain murky. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Director Nominations, 39 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 117, 133 (2014) (no state corporation statute, with the single exception of
Maryland’s, addresses the question who can nominate directors).
72. Shareholder meetings convened electronically may make it feasible for
shareholders to vote directly by online ballot, or to revoke or modify proxies already
submitted, during the shareholder meeting itself. Lisa M. Fairfax, Virtual Shareholder
Meetings Reconsidered, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1367, 1387-88 (2010) (discussing
electronic voting at remote-only meetings); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of
Increasing Shareholder Power: Forget Issuer Proxy Access and Focus on E-Proxy, 61
VAND. L. REV. 475, 487-91 (2008) (exploring e-proxy as an alternative for shareholders to
the traditional proxy statement, for use by shareholders); Hamermesh, supra note 71, at 139
n.112 (noting how shareholders’ meetings can be broadcast instantaneously in real time and
can replace in-person meetings).
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The only way unhappy shareholders can realistically run board
candidates of their own is if they are willing to bear the enormous costs of
preparing and distributing proxy materials regarding their nominees.73 The
high cost of proxy fights have made them rare, and this is exacerbated by
free rider problems, and rational apathy on the part of shareholders with
easy exit available through the Wall Street Rule.74 In contrast, an
incumbent board’s proxy solicitation, win or lose, is paid for by the
corporation. 75
Proponents of greater shareholder democracy have advocated for
easier shareholder access to the proxy for decades. 76 Within individual
corporations, however, shareholder proposals to provide proxy access for
shareholders’ nominations to the board were blocked by SEC Rule 14a8(i)(8), which until 2010 barred proxy access for shareholder proposals
related to corporate elections. 77 As a result, any change had to come
through SEC rulemaking or amendments to the federal securities laws. The
SEC considered adopting proxy access rules in 1942, 1982, 2003, and
2007, but each time declined to follow through. 78 Finally, in 2010,
prompted by the Dodd-Frank Act, 79 the SEC promulgated rules that would
have opened up the process. 80 The new mandate allowing shareholders
access to the proxy for their own nominees if certain prerequisites were
met, however, was struck down by a controversial decision from the D.C.

73. Median costs can range from several hundred thousand dollars to well into the
millions. See Bebchuk, supra note 39, at 688-89 (discussing the procedural and additional
costs that a rival teams must bear if they want to run a campaign with their own candidate);
Kahan & Rock, supra note 70, at 1365 (describing a study that indicated costs ranging from
$30,000 to $9 million). If challengers prevail, shareholder’s costs can be reimbursed by the
corporation, but if they lose, they bear the full cost of the challenge. Kahan & Rock, supra
note 70, at 1408-09.
74. See CLARK, supra note 46, at 389-400 (discussing the rational apathy problem, the
free rider problem, and the fairness problem).
75. See FAIRFAX, supra note 39, at 100 (stating that generally, corporations pay for
costs associated with incumbent or directors supported by management).
76. See FAIRFAX, supra note 39, at 129-31 (discussing the proxy access debate).
77. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16,
2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240 and 249) (adopting “changes to Federal
proxy rules to facilitate the effective exercise of shareholders’ traditional State law rights to
nominate and elect directors to company boards of director.”)
78. See FAIRFAX, supra note 39, at 131-36 (outlining the SEC’s first four attempts to
adopt proxy access rules).
79. Earlier versions of Dodd-Frank would have mandated proxy access rulemaking, but
as enacted, the law simply clarified that it is within the SEC’s powers to do so. Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376,
1915 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C 78n (Supp. IV 2011)).
80. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16,
2010).
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Circuit before it went into effect.81 Still intact, however, is a change in
SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(8) that now permits shareholder proposals to change the
way board nominations and elections are conducted, 82 although there have
been fewer of such proposals than many observers had anticipated.83
Even when unhappy shareholders are willing and able to mount a
proxy fight under the current process, they sometimes face the obstacle of
staggered terms on the board of directors.84 The corporation statutes of
most states mandate annual elections, but they do not mandate terms of
only one year. Instead, they permit corporations to elect their directors for
staggered terms of up to three years each.85 These staggered terms have the
effect of requiring dissident shareholders to wage and prevail in not one but
two consecutive proxy fights in order to take over a corporation’s board.
In unions, on the other hand, all officers and board members are
elected at the same time for the same term, allowing challengers to win

81. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that the
SEC’s cost-benefit analysis of the rule was inadequate); see also Jill E. Fisch, The Long
Road Back: Business Roundtable and the Future of SEC Rulemaking, 36 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 695, 698-709 (2013) (analyzing the Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144 decision); Grant
M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Bizarre Law and Economics of Business Roundtable
v. SEC., 38 J. CORP. L. 101, 120 (2012) (criticizing the Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144
court’s analysis of law and economics).
82. SEC Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2014) (allowing
shareholder proposals for director elections as long as they are permitted under state law);
see also, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112-13 (2014) (permitting shareholder proposals and
solicitation of proxies in connection with an election of directors, under Delaware state law).
83. See Catherine G. Dearlove & A. Jacob Werrett, Proxy Access by Private Ordering:
A Review of the 2012 and 2013 Proxy Seasons, 69 BUS. LAW. 155, 156 (2013) (observing
that support for such proposals may be growing, but at a slower rate than previously
anticipated).
84. As of the mid-2000s, a majority of corporate boards had staggered terms, but there
has been a trend away from these so-called classified boards, partly in response to
shareholder activism on the subject. See Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 861 (noting at that time
that a majority of public companies in the United States had staggered terms for board
members). See generally Mira Ganor, Why Do Managers Dismantle Staggered Boards?, 33
DEL. J. CORP. L. 149 (2008) (exploring the motivations behind the decision of many firms to
eliminate staggered terms for board members, including shareholder pressure or the agent’s
own interests). According to a recent survey, only eleven of the top 100 public companies
still use staggered boards. SHEARMAN & STERLING, LLP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2014:
12TH ANNUAL SURVEY OF THE LARGEST US PUBLIC COMPANIES 48 (2014), available at
https://reaction.shearman.com/reaction/corpgov/2014/SSGC_CorpGov-CompleteBook0908.pdf.
85. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2014) (detailing the procedure of
splitting up members of the board into up to three classes to expire in three different years);
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.06 (2010) (describing a similar process of dividing directors
into up to three groups with the terms for each group expiring after a different shareholders
meeting).
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control of the union in just one election cycle if they have the votes.86
Additionally, in great contrast to corporate elections, no union funds can be
expended in support of any candidates, whether incumbents or
challengers. 87 Moreover, all members have equal rights to nominate
candidates, so access to the ballot is not as easily controlled by the
incumbents. 88 At the national level, however, even where national officers
are elected by direct membership vote, candidates are nominated by
convention delegates and those nominations must receive a minimum
percentage of delegate support to win a place on the members’ ballots.89
Challengers in union elections may have easier access to a place on
the ballot than challengers in corporate elections, but they still have to
overcome the incumbents’ substantial advantages.90 One important
advantage involves campaign fundraising, which is most keenly felt at the
national level where the electorate can involve millions spread across all

86. Nothing in the LMRDA prohibits staggered terms for officers, so long as the terms
are no longer than the statutory maximums. 29 U.S.C. § 481 (2013). Nevertheless, I am not
aware of any unions that stagger the terms of their officers. Perhaps this is because it avoids
the costs of running additional elections or staging additional conventions. It may also be
that incumbent officers have no reason to support changes resulting in midterm elections
that could weaken their positions in their unions.
87. Id. § 481(g).
88. “Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges
within such organization to nominate candidates . . . .” Id. § 411(a)(1). Similarly, “every
member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office (subject to
section 504 of this title [barring certain felons from office] and to reasonable qualifications
uniformly imposed) . . . .” Id. § 481(e). The DOL and the courts have found unreasonable,
and therefore impermissible, eligibility requirements that have the effect of barring from
candidacy a very high percentage of the union’s membership. See, e.g., Local 3489, United
Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305 (1977) (holding an eligibility rule requiring attendance
at fifty percent of union meetings for three years prior to an election unreasonable because it
disqualified 96.5 percent of the members).
89. See, e.g., INT’L BHD. OF TEAMSTERS CONST. art. IV, § 2(a) (2011) (requiring support
from at least five percent of the delegates to be placed on the ballot). While that might seem
like an easy standard for a serious candidate to meet, a disproportionately high percentage of
convention delegates are usually loyal to the incumbent faction. In the Teamsters’ election
of 1991, for example, the winning slate of reformers won a three-way race with a forty-eight
percent plurality, but it had been nominated by only fifteen percent of the convention
delegates. JAMES B. JACOBS & KERRY T. COOPERMAN, BREAKING THE DEVIL’S PACT: THE
BATTLE TO FREE THE TEAMSTERS FROM THE MOB 98 (2011). In the 2006 election, a reform
slate running against a unified incumbent slate was barely nominated, with six percent of the
delegates, yet ended up with a respectable, though still losing, thirty-five percent of the
membership vote. Id. at 194, 197.
90. When an incumbent officer is planning to step down voluntarily, a common tactic
to preserve the advantages of incumbency for that officer’s faction is for the outgoing
officer to resign before the term ends. Then, the executive board, which typically has the
constitutional power to do so, appoints a hand-picked successor to finish out the term and
run for election in his or her own right as an incumbent.
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fifty states. 91 Whether nominators and voters are the members themselves
or elected delegates, waging a successful national campaign requires
significant funds for travel, printing, mailing, and potentially campaign
staff and consultants. 92 National campaigns also require legal advising and
at times involve litigation. In some unions, particularly those operating
under RICO consent decrees, 93 free space in the union magazine, which is
distributed by the union to all members, is made available to all candidates
to level the playing field.94 Often, however, incumbents can skirt the law
and pressure appointed officials, staff, and sometimes members, to
“voluntarily” contribute time and money to the campaign. 95 On the other
hand, union rules prohibiting “outsider” support for candidates have a
significant and disproportionate impact on challengers’ abilities to raise
funds for their campaigns. 96
Differences in terms of policies and process related to nominations
and campaign fundraising can affect the frequency with which director

91. For example, in the 2001 Teamsters election, the incumbent slate had a campaign
war chest of over $3.5 million, more than ten times the approximate $340,000 raised by
their challengers. JACOBS & COOPERMAN, supra note 89, at 173. In union locals, on the
other hand––the vast majority of which have 1000 or fewer members, see Goldberg, supra
note 53, at 11––face-to-face campaigning can usually reach a high percentage of voters, so
campaign costs may be relatively modest.
92. JACOBS & COOPERMAN, supra note 89, at 144.
93. See Goldberg, supra note 58, at 997-98 (discussing a consent decree between
Teamsters and federal prosecutors that called for direct elections by union members
themselves, rather than by convention delegates in a union infiltrated by organized crime).
94. See, e.g., INT’L BHD. OF TEAMSTERS, RULES FOR THE 2010-11 IBT INTERNATIONAL
UNION DELEGATE AND OFFICER ELECTION 38-40 (2010) (listing the rules governing the
publication and distribution of a candidate’s campaign literature in the union magazine, as
well as explaining the equal rights of each candidate to have his or her literature distributed,
so long as the candidate is willing to pay for the costs of distributing the material).
95. See JACOBS & COOPERMAN, supra note 89, at 165 (explaining the advantage of an
IBT incumbent due to his or her ability to rely on donations from thousands of IBT
officials); see also Edgar James, Union Democracy and the LMRDA: Autocracy and
Insurgency in National Union Elections, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 247, 331-32 (1978)
(describing Boyle’s failed attempt to characterize the contributions made by the union’s
staff as “voluntary,” since in truth, he collected upwards of $140,000 from all but nine of the
198 non-clerical staff members with incomes above $10,000).
96. See JACOBS & COOPERMAN, supra note 89, at 165 (discussing a rule imposed after a
1996 scandal, prohibiting candidates from taking donations from non-Teamsters, putting
insurgent candidates who could get contributions from outsiders at a disadvantage). The
LMRDA quite properly prohibits employer funding of candidates for union office. 29
U.S.C. § 481(g) (2013). Beyond that, many unions have adopted rules banning
contributions from non-employer union “outsiders,” such as retirees and candidates’ own
family members. These rules have been upheld under the LMRDA. See United
Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982) (holding that it was not a violation of the
LMRDA for a union rule to prohibit candidates from accepting contributions from
nonmembers).
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elections in public corporations, and officer elections in national unions,
are contested. In both cases, however, challenges are rarely successful.97
This trend could provide ammunition to opponents of enhanced shareholder
voting rights. Arguably, the projected low success rates of challenges do
not justify the costs of adopting enhanced voting rights provisions, whether
in terms of increased election expenditures or a reduction in efficiencies
associated with director-centered governance. 98
B. Rights to Propose, Campaign, and Vote
Beyond the right to elect directors, state corporation laws give
shareholders the right to vote on amendments to corporate charters and
bylaws, and on fundamental changes in the corporation’s structure, like
As a result of the Dodd-Frank Act,
mergers and dissolutions. 99
shareholders in public corporations also have an annual, but merely
advisory, “say on pay” with respect to executive compensation.100
Furthermore, SEC rules authorize shareholders to make proposals of their
own that must be included in the corporation’s proxy materials, assuming
they can satisfy the rule’s prerequisites and subject matter limitations.101

97. One study of corporate elections found a surprisingly high success rate of about
fifty percent for the challengers (obtaining at least some board representation through ballot
success or settlements with the incumbents), but noted that only thirteen percent of the
contested director elections were in large or mid-cap corporations. Thirty-one percent were
in small-cap companies and almost sixty percent in micro-cap firms. Kahan & Rock, supra
note 70, at 1369.
98. See, e.g., Harry G. Hutchison & R. Sean Alley, The High Costs of Shareholder
Participation, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 941, 945-48 (2009) (arguing that limited participation is
more beneficial to investors in that it holds fewer costs and creates more happiness than a
culture that promotes shareholder participation); see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 70, at
1426 (positing that shareholder proxy access would have both desirable and undesirable
effects that would balance each other out, with a net effect of around zero).
99. FAIRFAX, supra note 39, at 15-17. This includes the growing trend of managementled buyouts to make public companies private. See, e.g., Steven Davidoff, In American
Greetings Deal, Echoes of Larger Buyout for Dell, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2013,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/06/in-american-greetings-deal-echoes-of-largerbuyout-for-dell/ (telling the stories of two management-led buyouts, one by Michael S. Dell
and Silver Lake Partners of the personal computer maker founded by Mr. Dell, and another
by the Weiss family of the American Greetings Corporation).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (Supp. IV 2011). Union members have no comparable right to
vote on their officers’ compensation, unless a vote is required by the union’s constitution or
bylaws. They can, however, challenge unreasonably high officer compensation through
union member derivative suits pursuant to the LMRDA. See infra text accompanying notes
193-197.
101. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2012) (outlining the requirements necessary in order
for a shareholder’s proposal to be included in a company’s proxy statement). Proposals
cannot, for example, be improper under state law or cause the company to violate a law; be
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Shareholder proposals generally focus on social issues or corporate
governance. Social issues raised in recent years include climate change
and other environmental concerns, health care costs and reform, global
human and labor rights, and EEO and diversity matters. 102 Governance
proposals have sought to eliminate classified boards, limit poison pills as
obstacles to hostile takeovers, require a majority of votes cast to elect
directors, 103 bar board chairs from simultaneously serving as CEOs, and
facilitate shareholder proxy access for nominations to the board. 104 In the
wake of Citizens United v. FEC, 105 proposals seeking greater disclosure
about corporate political spending have become the single most common
subject of shareholder proposals. 106

based on personal grievances or special interests; involve management functions relating to
ordinary business operations; or be of no relevance to the company. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a8(i) (2012). An earlier SEC ban on shareholder proposals, to change the way board
members are nominated or elected, was substantially lifted in 2010. See 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-8(i)(8) (2012) (reflecting the current rules governing shareholder elections). See
generally FAIRFAX, supra note 39, at 63-83 (discussing the shareholder proposal rule
originating from Rule 14a-8 of the Exchange Act, including substantive exclusions, as well
as the evolution and future of the rule, and the impact of shareholder proposals).
102. See INVESTOR RESEARCH RESPONSIBILITY CTR. INST., KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF
PROMINENT SHAREHOLDER-SPONSORED PROPOSALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL TOPICS,
2005-2011 8 (2013) (providing a list of environmental and social proposal topics from 2005
through 2011, including the highest and lowest supported proposals, and describing the key
characteristics of those proposals).
103. In union officer elections, a plurality of votes cast is sufficient, although in NLRB
certification and decertification votes, runoffs would be necessary to determine whether a
union seeking to represent the employees in question has the majority support required by
section 9(a) of the NLRA. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49
Stat. 449, 453 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2013)).
104. See generally Barry B. Burr, Fewer Shareholder Proposals, Greater Board
Outreach
Seen,
PENSIONS
&
INVS.
ONLINE
(Jan.
21,
2013),
http://www.pionline.com/article/20130121/PRINTSUB/301219980
(explaining
how
companies are increasingly reaching out to institutional investors regarding issues of
executive compensation, creating a trend resulting in fewer shareholder proposals and more
shareholder support for directors and executive compensation); James R. Copland, 2013
Proxy Season Review, THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Aug. 5, 2013, 9:07 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2013/08/05/2013-proxy-season-review-2/ (providing a summary of 2013
shareholder proposals, including proposal types, proposal sponsorship, and the voting
results associated with those proposals).
105. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
106. See Copland, supra note 104 (attributing the increased focus of proposals on 2012
and 2013 on political spending and lobbying to the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens
United, 558 U.S. 310). Some reformers see this, as well as the question of who gets to
decide how money raised for political campaigns is spent, as potential topics for SEC
rulemaking. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate
Political Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923, 925-28 (2013) (presenting the case for mandatory
SEC rules calling for public companies to disclose their political spending, arguing that this
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Like shareholder “say on pay,” shareholder votes on their own
proxy proposals usually have only a precatory or advisory effect. They do
not bind the board or management. 107 But that does not mean shareholder
proposals are of no value to activist shareholders. They can lead to direct
negotiations with management, sometimes resulting in the voluntary
adoption of the proposed changes. If a board refuses to adopt proposals
that have won the proxy vote, shareholders can exert further pressure in the
form of “vote no” campaigns in subsequent board elections.108
Union members’ rights to vote extend beyond the election of officers
and board members, but the only additional member votes required by law
relate to dues increases. 109 Whether members can vote on other matters––
even as important as the ratification of collective bargaining agreements or
mergers with other unions––is left up to the unions themselves. 110 There is
disclosure is essential for safeguarding the interests of shareholders); see also Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 83, 85-117 (2010) (positing that the Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 decision
increases the need for lawmakers to design special rules regarding how public corporations
can make political speech decisions, and proposing a framework for designing such rules).
107. This is because “[p]roposals by security holders that mandate or direct the board to
take certain action may constitute an unlawful intrusion on the board’s discretionary
authority under the typical statute.” Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by
Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12,999, Investment Company Act Release No.
9,539, 1976 SEC LEXIS 326, at *20 (Nov. 22, 1976). Under certain circumstances,
shareholders can propose binding amendments to corporate bylaws. There is so much
uncertainty, however, regarding what those circumstances might be that even bylaw
proposals usually take a precatory form. Andrew R. Brownstein & Igor Kirman, Can a
Board Say No When Shareholders Say Yes? Responding to Majority Vote Resolutions, 60
BUS. LAW. 23, 52-59 (2004). Moreover, bylaw amendments cannot be inconsistent with
corporate charters, and under the Delaware statute and the Model Act, only the directors can
initiate amendments in these corporate charters. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2014);
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03 (2010).
108. See Brownstein & Kirman, supra note 107, at 45-52 (discussing “vote no”
campaigns, a method utilized by shareholders to withhold votes from nominees for director
when the public is dissatisfied with the board of directors, and wants to pressure the board to
adopt certain changes).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3) (2013). Union members also retain their right to vote in
decertification and change of certification elections conducted by the NLRB or other labor
relations agencies. See supra text accompanying note 29.
110. Member litigation to compel votes provided for in union constitutions or bylaws
can be brought as state contract law claims, and sometimes as federal claims, for violation
of labor contracts. See, e.g., Korzen v. Local 705, Int’l Bhd of Teamsters, 75 F.3d 285, 288
(7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a local union’s constitution is a contract between the local
union and its members and is therefore enforceable under state common law whereas suits
enforcing provisions of international union constitutions fall within federal jurisdiction).
Circuits are split on whether a union’s denial of the right to vote on a particular issue can
constitute a violation of the LMRDA’s equal right to vote guaranteed by 29 U.S.C. §
411(a)(1), if all of the union’s members are denied that vote. Compare Christopher v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 644 F.2d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that a breach of § 411(a)(1)
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one major caveat, however, that if any members have a right to vote on a
particular matter pursuant to the union’s constitution or bylaws, then all
members have equal rights to vote as well. 111 This differs from the
corporate setting, where different classes of stock can have different voting
rights. 112
Opportunities for union members to propose resolutions or
amendments to union constitutions and bylaws vary, depending on whether
the union is national or local. National union constitutions are typically
amended by the votes of elected convention delegates. In some unions, for
a proposed amendment to be considered on the floor, it must be reported
out by a relevant committee, which is likely under the control of the
union’s incumbent leadership. 113 In locals, on the other hand, meeting
agendas typically provide the opportunity to discuss “new business” or
“good and welfare,” during which members can make motions in support
of their proposals. 114 Members can generally propose and vote on
amendments to local bylaws, although the process typically extends beyond
one membership meeting. 115 Amendments to local bylaws, however, often
require the approval of the national union before they can go into effect.116
of the LMRDA occurs if all members of a union are equally denied the right to vote), with
Angel v. Paperworkers Local 1967, 221 F. App’x. 393, 399-400 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding
that since the alleged violation of the union’s constitution and bylaws led to a universal
denial of a ratification vote, the plaintiffs did not successfully allege the discrimination
required by §411(a)(1) of the LMRDA), and Stelling v. Int’l. Bhd. Of Elec. Workers, 587
F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1978) (concluding that since voting rights related to a particular question
were universally denied, a claim under §411(a)(1) of the LMRDA was not properly stated).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (2013). See infra note 138 (observing that the voting rights
conferred by § 411(a)(1) can be limited by provisions set out in a union’s constitution and
bylaws).
112. See infra text accompanying note 139 (noting that preferred stock in corporations
are, ironically, often not granted voting rights).
113. See, e.g., INT’L BHD. OF TEAMSTERS, INT’L BHD. OF TEAMSTERS CONST., art. III, § 8,
at 26, § 9, at 26-28 (2011), available at http://teamster.org/sites/teamster.org/files/IBTConstitution-2011.pdf (illustrating the committee approval process required before union
amendments can be voted on by the broader membership).
114. See, e.g., AM. FED’N OF STATE, CNTY. & MUN. EMPS., AFL-CIO, AFSCME INT’L
CONST. 158-59 app. c (2012), available at afscme13.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/ AFSCME_
International_Constitution_2012.pdf (offering an example of the suggested order of business
at local union meetings including an allocation of time for “New Business” and “Good and
Welfare”).
115. See, e.g., id. at 144 app. e (providing for the amendment of local Constitutions by a
majority vote of the members through a process that requires approval at two consecutive
meetings).
116. See, e.g., UNITED AUTO., AEROSPACE & AGRIC. IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AM.,
UAW, CONST. OF THE INT’L UNION, art. 37, § 3, at 104 (2010) available at
uaw.org/sites/default/files/UAW-2010-constitution.PDF (providing that all Local Unions’
by-laws are not effective until submitted to the International Executive Board, with few
exceptions).
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Incumbent officers, sometimes trying to deny their political opponents
victories of any kind, find creative ways to prevent proposals from coming
to a vote. In the Teamsters Union, for example, reformers for many years
waged bylaws campaigns in local unions, seeking to make business agents
and shop stewards elected rather than appointed positions or attempting to
end multiple salaries for officers. 117 In order to deny reformers the
opportunity to present their amendments at a regularly scheduled
membership meeting as the bylaws required, the officers of one local
conducted an illegal mail referendum, encouraging members to vote
against even convening a meeting for that purpose. 118 Years later, the
union’s national leadership succeeded in institutionalizing another way to
block reformers’ efforts to convert business agent positions from being
determined by appointment rather than election. The national leadership
simply pushed through an amendment to the International Constitution that
entirely bars local unions from making that change. 119
Once member or shareholder proposals make it to the ballot, those in
power can manipulate votes by bundling popular proposals with unpopular
ones with the aim of either blocking the approval of popular proposals or
enhancing the prospects of unpopular ones. With respect to unions, courts
have sometimes found that bundling violates the LMRDA when a vote on a
dues increase is tied to the ratification of a wage increase.120 Otherwise,
however, bundling is left to the discretion of union leadership. In the
117. See Michael J. Goldberg, Teamster Reformers: Their Union, Their Jobs, Their
Movement, 72 J. TRANSP. L., LOGISTICS & POL’Y 13, 16 (2005) (describing the types of
issues union members have organized around in regards to union governance, including
democratic local union bylaws that provide for the election rather than appointment of
business agents and shop stewards and the end to multiple salaries for union officials).
118. Wade v. Teamsters Local 247, 527 F. Supp. 1169, 1178-79 (E.D. Mich. 1981)
(detailing how a local Teamsters Executive Board sent a letter to its members presenting a
biased portrayal of a proposed bylaw amendment in an attempt to prevent it from being
voted on).
119. See INT’L BHD. OF TEAMSTERS supra note 113, art. XXII, § 8, at 26 (2011),
available at http://teamster.org/sites/teamster.org/files/IBT-Constitution-2011.pdf (stating
that “no [l]ocal [u]nion may amend its [b]ylaws to provide for the election of [b]usiness
[a]gents”).
120. See, e.g., Sertic v. Cuyaghoga Carpenters Dist. Council of United Bhd. of
Carpenters, 423 F.2d 515, 521 (6th Cir. 1970) (holding that by combining the authorization
to negotiate a wage assessment with a vote on a wage increase violated the LMRDA in
denying union members’ right to a “meaningful vote on increases in dues or assessments.”).
But see, e.g., Sheldon v. O’Callaghan, 497 F.2d 1276, 1280 (2d Cir. 1974) (bundling
permissible where dues increase and other proposals all are interrelated parts of a proposed
new union’s constitution). Where the bundling does not involve a dues increase, courts are
more inclined to permit it. See, e.g., Johnson v. Kay, 671 F. Supp. 268, 274-75 (S.D.N.Y.
1987), aff’d on other grounds, 860 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that the packaging of a
proposed set of amendments was appropriate where they all shared an intent to shift the
locus of power in the union and breaking them apart could lead to internal inconsistency).
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corporate setting, while SEC Rule 14a-4 limits bundling, 121 one study has
demonstrated that it remains an issue at least in the context of merger votes
being combined with votes on staggered boards. 122
In both unions and corporations, issues arise in relation to the
distribution of campaign materials. In the corporate context, stockholders
can gain access to shareholder names and addresses for campaigning, 123 but
only at their own expense in contrast to incumbent officers and directors
who campaign on the corporation’s dime. 124 As noted previously, union
resources cannot be expended to support any candidate in elections.125 Any
other distributions of campaign literature are undertaken at the expense of
the candidates, although the LMRDA facilitates this dispersal by requiring
unions to provide opportunities for candidates to use union mailing lists to
distribute their materials.126 The LMRDA does not provide a similar
express right for mailing material related to votes on other matters, such as
dues increases or contract ratifications, and the circuit courts are split on
whether such a right can be implied. 127 Union officers are generally free to
121. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(1) (2014); see also Greenlight Capital, L.P. v. Apple,
Inc., No. 13 Civ. 900, 2013 WL 646547, at *5, *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2013) (holding that
unbundling rules demand that when proposals are separate matters such that shareholders
would treat them differently in denying or approving them, they may not be combined in a
single package for voting purposes).
122. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Ehud Kamar, Bundling and Entrenchment, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 1549 (2010).
123. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 219(a), 220(b)(1) (2014); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
16.02 (2010).
124. See supra text accompanying note 75 (asserting that corporations typically pay for
any costs associated with incumbent officers or directors that have the support of
management).
125. 29 U.S.C § 481(g) (2013). Thus, it is an election violation for incumbents to use
union newsletters or magazines to promote their own candidacies, but the union is free to
make equal space available to all candidates for their campaign messages. Nothing in the
LMRDA mandates this, but such “battle pages” have been required in Teamsters elections
since the 1989 RICO consent decree. See supra text accompanying note 94 (listing the rules
governing the campaign literature of candidates, noting the equal rights in regards to
literature distributed, depending on the candidate’s willingness to pay for the costs of
distributing the material).
126. 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (2013). Candidates have a right to inspect, but not copy the
union’s mailing list. As a result, their mailings are typically completed by the union with
costs billed to the candidate or by commercial mailing houses obliged to keep the lists
confidential. A recent decision extends this right to lists of email addresses. Diamondstein
v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 964 F. Supp.2d 37 (D.D.C. 2013).
127. Compare Carothers v. Presser, 818 F.2d 926, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (ruling that the
LMRDA does not afford an absolute right of access to a union’s mailing list and that access
may only be provided as a remedy to an independent violation of the statute) with Sheldon
v. O’Callaghan, 497 F.2d 1276, 1282-83 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding the LMRDA required a
union to make a list of its members available to ensure members could fairly express their
view on a referendum).
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distribute at union expense their views on pending proposals without any
obligation to provide equal access to their opponents. 128 Members,
however, have rights under the LMRDA’s free speech protections to speak
regarding pending proposals at meetings, 129 distribute materials to the
members, and picket the meeting. 130
In electing corporate directors, the debate over shareholder proxy
access is not restricted to the nomination of candidates; it also concerns
whether the corporation should pay for distributing information about
candidates not nominated by the board. 131 Access to the proxy for
shareholder proposals covers distribution at the corporation’s expense of
sponsors’ statements supporting their proposals. However, that alone does
not level the playing field. Shareholders’ statements of support are limited
to 500 words while opposing board statements have no length
restrictions. 132 In addition, while proposals that corporations reimburse
128. In extreme cases of misrepresentation or significant omissions in materials
distributed by a union, however, some courts have found violations of members’ equal right
to vote or of officers’ fiduciary duties, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) and § 501. See,
e.g., Christopher v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 644 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that 29
U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) guarantees that every union member has an equal right to vote and
participate and a categorical denial of all members’ right to vote on collective bargaining
agreements violates this right); Wade v. Teamsters Local 247, 527 F. Supp. 1169 (E.D.
Mich. 1981) (ruling that the union violated a general fiduciary duty granted under 29 U.S.C.
§ 501 by failing to hold monthly membership meetings and thereby denying members an
ability to vote on a by-law amendment). But see, e.g., Members for a Better Union v.
Bevona, 152 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1998) (concluding that 29 U.S.C. § 411 was not violated by a
claim that an union vote was tainted as the statute narrowly prohibits only clearly
discriminatory treatment in members’ voting rights); Ackley v. W. Conf. of Teamsters, 958
F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding the LMRDA does not require that union leadership fully
disclose all the terms and information relate to a collective bargaining agreement before
subject it to a vote for ratification). One court found an LMRDA free speech violation when
a national union, which regularly sold ads in its magazine, refused to sell space to a local
union soliciting opposition to a proposed contract up for a ratification vote. Knox Co.
Local, Nat’l Rural Letter Carriers Ass’n v. Nat’l Rural Letter Carriers Ass’n, 720 F.2d 936,
939-41 (6th Cir. 1984).
129. This right is subject to a union’s “established and reasonable rules pertaining to the
conduct of meetings.” 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (2013).
130. See Graham v. Soloner, 220 F. Supp. 711, 714-15 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (concluding, in
part, that union members’ rights to picket union meetings is protected by the LMRDA).
131. Challengers nominated through traditional proxy fights can have their election
costs paid by the corporation if they are successful in taking control of the board, but until
recently, in Delaware at least, if dissident shareholders ran only a “short slate” of
candidates—less than the number it takes to win a board majority—the winning candidates
on such a slate could not be reimbursed even pursuant to shareholder proposals mandating
reimbursement in such circumstances. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953
A.2d 227, 240 (Del. 2008). In 2009, the Delaware statute was amended to permit such
shareholder proposals. 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 113(a) (2014).
132. See FAIRFAX, supra note 39, at 65-66 (explaining that the 500 word limit is
included for expense purposes).
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sponsors of successful proposals for promotional expenses are permissible
under Rule 14a-8, some commentators are skeptical that this approach will
be widely utilized.133
There is greater regulation of the content of campaign materials in the
corporate setting than in unions because of SEC proxy rules mandating
certain disclosures and prohibiting fraud and deceptive nondisclosure. 134
Corresponding requirements are not included in the LMRDA. 135 In fact,
the statute’s protection of members’ freedom of speech has been broadly
construed to protect even defamatory speech from union retaliation. 136
133. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 863, 903 (2013) (pursuing such proposals “is both highly speculative and dilutes the
activist’s single minded campaign to increase the target’s stock price and thus the activist’s
credibility.”).
134. Solicitation of Proxies, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1, -15, -101 (2014). Before 1992, the
SEC’s rules significantly interfered with shareholders’ ability to communicate with each
other about upcoming proxy contests by treating all such communications as proxy
solicitations. This required shareholders to bear all the expense associated with filing
formal proxy statements with the SEC. The 1992 amendments, however, make clear that if
the communication does not contain an actual request for shareholders’ proxies, no proxy
statement need be filed. This change made it much easier for institutional shareholders to
coordinate their efforts on corporate governance matters. See FAIRFAX, supra note 39, at
117-18 (explaining the SEC’s reasoning in amending the 1992 rule and noting the
significant increase in communications following the rule).
In labor law, where the focus is protecting the right of employees to engage in
“concerted activities for . . . mutual aid and protection,” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2013) (emphasis
added), it is hard to imagine any statute or rule prohibiting members from communicating
with one another on governance matters.
In addition, union attempts to limit
communications among members run afoul of the members’ LMRDA free speech rights. 29
U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (2013)
135. Indeed, there are no statutory protections against fraud in the labor market in
American labor law. Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified Absence of Federal Fraud Protection
in the Labor Market, 107 YALE L.J. 715, 722 (1997). In rare cases, however, some courts
entertain challenges to union referenda where extreme distortions or material omissions
from materials accompanying mail ballots might violate the LMRDA’s protection of union
members’ equal right to vote or the fiduciary duties union officers own their members. See
e.g., supra text accompanying note 127 (discussing LMRDA referendum requirements).
Not only do union members have minimal, if any, protections against fraud in the labor
market, but they do not even have the standard protections from fraud available in the
securities market when their own employer provides them with misleading information,
encouraging them to purchase or retain shares in their employing company. Jennifer
O’Hare, Misleading Employer Communications and the Securities Fraud Implications of the
Employee as Investor, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1217 (2003). In conducting union certification and
decertification votes, the NLRB has at times attempted to regulate the truthfulness of union
or management campaign materials. But it ultimately abandoned that effort due to the belief
that voters could recognize campaign propaganda for what it is and due to difficulties in
administering the standard that could lead to delays in finalizing election results. Midland
Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982)
136. See Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963) (finding that the LMRDA
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However, even in corporate contests, once a proxy statement is approved,
“contestants are free to send out supplementary materials without
significant oversight.” 137
There are also major differences between corporate and union
campaigning in terms of who can vote. In unions, all members have equal
rights to vote. 138 Corporations by default adhere to the one-share one-vote
principle, but in practice can issue different types of shares with enhanced,
reduced, or no voting rights. 139 In addition, there are other strategies and
mechanisms for watering down a corporate vote, such as voting trusts and
legal forms of vote buying. 140
Departures from the one-share, one-vote principle––and arguments
against enhancing the shareholder voice in corporate governance
generally––are often justified by the fact that there are shareholders with
different objectives and levels of commitment to the company. Further
justification is derived from the fact that some of these shareholders’ short
term interests may be in direct conflict with the long term success of the
enterprise. 141 A heterogeneous electorate can also be present in unions.
protects union members’ right to make critical charges regarding the activities of the union
and that any provisions of a union’s constitution that restrict such criticism are
unenforceable). The offended party is free to pursue a defamation claim in court, but
plaintiffs in the context of labor disputes face the same heightened standard for proving a
claim that faces public figures. See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383
U.S. 53, 62, 65-66 (1966) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964))
(noting that the malice test is applied in the cases of defamation in a labor context, such that
defamatory statements are recoverable only if published with the knowledge of there being
false or in reckless disregard of their accuracy).
137. Lee Harris, The Politics of Shareholder Voting, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1761, 1766 n.27
(2011).
138. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (2013). This right is “subject to reasonable rules . . . [in the
union’s] constitution and bylaws.” Id. For example, it is acceptable for a union to allow
only members working in a particular department, or on a specific shift, to vote to elect the
shop stewards representing that department or shift. Members working in other departments
or shifts, however, should have the right to vote for their stewards as well.
139. In the context of shareholder rights, it is perhaps ironic that preferred stock
typically lacks voting rights. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 40, § 18.12 (discussing the
generally limited voting rights of preferred stockholders).
140. See Robert B. Thompson & Paul E. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV.
129, 158-66 (2009) (analyzing the decoupling of voting rights and financial interest in the
context of corporate governance through voting trusts and buying shareholder votes).
141. See, e.g., Hayden & Bodie, supra note 7, at 448 (“hedged shareholders might vote
against the interests of the corporation”); Roberta S. Karmel, Voting Power Without
Responsibility or Risk: How Should Proxy Reform Address the Decoupling of Economic
and Voting Rights, 55 VILL. L. REV. 93 (2010) (describing “empty voting” by proxies of
“shareholders with little or no economic interest in the shares they vote”); Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be
Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long
Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1 (2010) (describing tension between interests of short term and long
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For example, older members might have different collective bargaining
priorities than younger ones (pensions and health care, as opposed to more
take-home pay), and working mothers might have different priorities than
other members (perhaps more flexible work hours). 142
In any governance system based on elections and voting, concerns
arise about the integrity of the ballot, the fairness of the count, and voters’
protections against retaliation, intimidation, or coercion in exercising their
rights. Those concerns are quite serious in unions, given notorious
examples in labor history of important unions infiltrated by organized
crime or headed by ruthless autocrats willing to do anything to hold onto
power. 143 For that reason, the LMRDA not only protects members’
freedom of speech, rights to nominate, and rights to vote, but it also
prohibits unions from disciplining members without due process, 144
provides members with federal claims against unions or officers who
interfere with their rights, 145 and makes it a federal crime to interfere with
those rights using threats, intimidation, or violence.146 The statute gives the
Secretary of Labor exclusive jurisdiction over post-election challenges to
term stockholders). But see, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of Shareholders
and the Myth of Investor Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 101 (2010) (noting that
different shareholders have different goals for the performance of the stock); Mark J. Roe,
Corporate Short-Termism - In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 977
(2013) (providing an evaluation of the short-termist point of view).
142. See Schwab, supra note 19, at 401 (describing the differences in desires between
the younger and older generation, with the subsequent justifications for the differences).
143. A prime example is organized crime’s impact on union governance in the
Teamsters union in the decades before the government’s RICO consent decree. See
generally JACOBS & COOPERMAN, supra note 89 (discussing how organized crime influenced
the Teamsters Union); DAN E. MOLDEA, THE HOFFA WARS (1978); CLARK R. MOLLENHOFF,
TENTACLES OF POWER: THE STORY OF JIMMY HOFFA (1965) (chronicling the involvement of
prominent American labor union leader Jimmy Hoffa in organized crime including fraud,
tampering, and bribery); JAMES NEFF, MOBBED UP 245 (1989) (describing relationships
between Cleveland mob bosses and Teamster president Jackie Presser). Organized crime, on
the other hand, was not involved with a murderous attempt to destroy the opposition in the
United Mine Workers in 1969. Tony Boyle, the union’s corrupt and autocratic president,
faced an election challenge from reformers led by Joseph (Jock) Yablonski, a UMW district
president and member of the union’s executive board. Boyle’s response was to order the
murders of Yablonski and his family. PAUL F. CLARK, THE MINERS’ FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY
23-26 (1981).
144. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (2013). Union discipline can include suspensions or
expulsion from membership, temporary or permanent bars from running for union office,
and monetary fines, which if lawfully imposed, are enforceable in court. OSBORNE, supra
note 48, at 45.
145. 29 U.S.C. §§ 412, 529 (2013). Members can also sue for breach of the duty of fair
representation if they can prove the union failed to adequately represent them in contractual
grievances, including discharges, in retaliation for their dissident activities. Summers, supra
note 17, at 274-75.
146. 29 U.S.C. § 530 (2013).
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elections of officers; 147 but until the election is completed, candidates can
bring their own actions to enforce their election rights.148 There is no DOL
oversight or enforcement when it comes to union votes on other matters,
although members can sometimes obtain remedies in the courts for unfairly
conducted referenda if they can show violations of their equal right to vote
or a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the conducting officers.149 A
refusal by the union’s leadership to implement the results of a vote can also
violate the members’ equal right to vote. 150 If the vote is to ratify a
contract, however, the remedies may be quite limited. Even if serious
violations occurred during the ratification process, or a required vote was
not held at all, once a collective bargaining agreement has been put into
place, it is virtually impossible to undo the results.151
Because most shareholders in public corporations do not have
secondary relationships with corporations that are “both valuable to the
shareholder and terminable by the board”,152 shareholders are less likely
than union members to encounter retaliation or coercion for positions they
take or votes they cast.153 But that does not mean corporate voting does not
147. Id. § 483. Union democracy advocates have been critical of the DOL for the way it
exercises, or refuses to exercise, its post-election enforcement powers. See, e.g., HERMAN
BENSON, DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS FOR UNION MEMBERS: A GUIDE TO INTERNAL UNION
DEMOCRACY 95-113 (1979); Joseph L. Rauh, LMRDA––Enforce It or Repeal It, 5 GA. L.
REV. 643, 645-46 (1971) (lamenting how the DOL does not prioritize these powers).
148. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (2013) (codifying the right to mail out campaign
literature). The Department of Labor has issued extensive guidance on what constitutes a
fair union election. 29 C.F.R. § 452.1 (2014).
149. See 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (2013) (codifying that every member of a labor
organization has equal voting rights); id. § 501 (2013) (codifying the duties of union officers
and procedures for suing officers for a violation of their duties); supra text accompanying
note 128 (discussing cases where courts have found a violation of members’ equal right to
vote).
150. See Pignotti v. Local #3 Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, 343 F. Supp. 236, 243
(D. Neb. 1972), aff’d, 477 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1973) (declaring that it is a statutory violation
to deny this right to vote in this context).
151. See Alan Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793, 796 (1984)
(explaining that a victory on the merits would more likely result only in prospective relief,
making sure the same violations are not repeated in future ratification votes).
152. K.A.D. Camara, Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in Corporate Law,
2004 WISC. L. REV. 1425, 1458 (internal footnote omitted).
153. Shareholders who do have such relationships, perhaps as employees of the
corporation or contractors with it, can be vulnerable to “special punishment” that can
influence how they vote. Id. For example, in litigation challenging Hewlett-Packard’s
acquisition of Compaq in 2002, there were allegations that one of HP’s major institutional
shareholders, Deutsche Bank, switched its votes at the last minute to support the acquisition
out of fear of losing HP’s existing banking business or in hope of acquiring more of HP’s
business. See Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard, No. Civ. A. 19513–NC, 2002 WL 549137, at *23, *12 (Del. Ch., April 8, 2002) (explaining the reasoning behind Deutsche Bank’s decision
to change their votes). To the extent employee-shareholders’ communications blow the
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suffer from pathologies of its own. 154 For that reason, improperly
conducted votes can be the basis for breach of fiduciary duty claims; both
the Delaware statute and the Model Act authorize the appropriate courts to
hear shareholder challenges to the conduct or the outcome of director
elections or shareholder votes on any other matters. 155 Where appropriate,
courts can order reruns of challenged votes under the supervision of court
appointed masters. 156
III.

SHAREHOLDER AND UNION MEMBER LITIGATION

Shareholders and union members have much in common when it
comes to the causes of action, remedies, and procedural devices available
to them. These can be used to enforce their individual rights as
shareholders or members in direct litigation or to enforce claims on behalf
of their corporations or unions in shareholder and union member derivative
litigation. 157 For example, members and shareholders can bring direct
actions against their unions or corporations for access to books and records,
if they can demonstrate a “proper purpose” 158 or “just cause.” 159 Similarly,

whistle on corporate misconduct, Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-retaliation provisions might apply,
although their effectiveness is debatable. See Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s
Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1, 35 (2012) (using the 2008
financial crisis as an example of the ineffectiveness of the whistle blowing).
154. See generally Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate
Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227, 1249-65 (2008) (noting the corporate voting pathologies of
complexity, confusion in ownership, and misalignment between voting rights and economic
interest).
155. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 225 (2014); Corporate Law Committee, ABA Section of
Business Law, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act – Amendment to Section
7.22 Relating to Irrevocable Proxies and Adoption of Section 7.29A Providing for Judicial
Review of Corporate Elections, Shareholder Votes, and Other Corporate Governance
Disputes, 67 BUS. LAW. 729 (2012).
156. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 227 (2014); Corporate Law Committee, ABA Section of
Business Law, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act – Proposed Adoption of
Section 7.29A Providing for Judicial Review of Corporate Elections, Shareholder Votes,
and Other Corporate Governance Disputes, 66 BUS. LAW. 963, 972 (2011).
157. Direct litigation can be brought on behalf of other members or shareholders as
well, through class actions, particularly securities class actions in the corporate arena. See
generally Symposium, Litigation Reform Since the PSLRA: A Ten-Year Retrospective, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1479 (2006). Derivative cases are always, in effect, collective actions,
because they are brought on behalf of entities in which other shareholders or members share
common interests.
158. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 220(b), (c) (2014); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 16.02,
16.04 (2010).
159. 29 U.S.C. § 431(c) (2013).
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they can bring direct actions to enforce their voting rights in their unions or
corporations. 160
This section focuses most closely on the derivative actions
shareholders and union members also have in common. Those are suits
brought by shareholders or members on behalf of their corporation or
union, where the organization’s officers and board have refused to bring
the case themselves. Any damages recovered go into the corporate or
union coffers, not the plaintiffs’ pockets, but their attorneys may be entitled
to substantial fee awards. 161 In 1959, when Congress created the federal
cause of action for union member derivative suits,162 it modeled this cause
of action on the shareholder derivative suit as it existed at the time. 163 We
are about to explore the very different paths these two types of cases
followed from that point fifty-five years ago.
A. The Derivative Claims of Shareholders and Union Members
A shareholder derivative suit is brought by one or more shareholders
on behalf of the corporation itself, where the corporation, through its
officers or directors, has failed to bring or authorize, the case. If the
plaintiffs can overcome the daunting procedural obstacles to bringing a
derivative action, 164 they can pursue claims on behalf of the corporation
that generally target current or former officers or directors who were
disloyal or dishonest in their dealings with the corporation, or who failed to
exercise due care on its behalf.165 These cases typically seek substantial
damage awards, but plaintiffs can also seek equitable relief, and settlements
of these cases often include non-pecuniary remedies such as appointments
of financial advisors or monitors, or the adoption of governance reforms
intended to prevent the types of abuses that were the subject of the
litigation. 166
160. See id. §§ 411(a)(1), (4) (codifying a labor organization’s members’ equal rights
and privileges with respect to voting and protecting members’ right to sue); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 227 (2014) (enforcing the Chancery Court’s power to determine the “right and
power of persons claiming to own stock” in any various proceedings connected to voting.)
161. See generally DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW
AND PRACTICE (2003) (covering the procedural and substantive questions posed by
shareholders’ derivative suits on behalf of corporations); OSBORNE, supra note 48, at 137-79
(discussing the LMRDA fiduciary standards and procedures for enforcing them).
162. 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2013).
163. See infra text accompanying note 179.
164. See infra text accompanying notes 233-239.
165. DEMOTT, supra note 161, at 3 (Supp. 2010-2011). Shareholders can also assert
claims against third parties on behalf of the corporation. DEMOTT, supra note 161, at 1-2.
166. See generally DEMOTT, supra note 161, at § 7:6, at 7-42 to -49 (discussing various
remedies of derivative litigation).
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Unlike the shareholder derivative suit, which was a creation of the
courts of equity, 167 the union members’ derivative suit was primarily the
creation of Congress. 168 But there is no doubt that Congress had
shareholder suits in mind when § 501 was enacted. Certainly the chief
sponsor of that portion of the bill did,169 describing the cause of action
created by § 501(b) this way: “[I]f the union fails to bring suit upon the
request of the member, the member may apply to . . . court for leave to
bring an action on behalf of the organization similar to a minority
shareholder’s suit against a corporation.” 170 The courts have also
recognized, and acted upon, that similarity. In one of the earliest § 501(b)
decisions, the court mentioned the “repeated reference[s] in the
[LMRDA’s] legislative history to the similarities between the duties of a
union official and a corporate officer.”171 The court then held that state law
governing shareholder derivative suits could be a source of guidance in
construing Title V. 172
The Committee Report, however, also recognized that “the detailed
application of [general] fiduciary principles to a particular trustee, officer,
or agent has always depended upon the character of the activity.” 173
Accordingly, § 501(a) expressly requires union officers’ fiduciary duties to

167. See, e.g., Ann M. Scarlett, Shareholder Derivative Litigation’s Historical and
Normative Foundations, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 837, 887-91 (2013) (discussing the creation and
development of shareholders’ derivative suit).
168. 29 U.S.C. § 501 (2013). State causes of action for union officers’ breach of
fiduciary duties, which also had their roots in equity, were available before the LMRDA but
were little used. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, Internal Affairs of Unions Under the Labor
Reform Act of 1959, 58 MICH. L. REV. 819, 827 (1960) (noting that “union officers and
employees have always been subject to the usual common-law fiduciary duties . . . .
Violations are repressible in the state courts. . . . The duty is so seldom enforced . . . .”).
169. Title V of the LMRDA, which contains § 501, was taken virtually unchanged from
H.R. 8342, 86th Cong. § 501 (1959), commonly known as the Elliott bill. See, e.g., Cox,
supra note 168, at 822-23 (discussing the Landrum-Griffin Bill that integrated the Elliot
proposals).
170. 105 CONG. REC. 15,549 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Elliott). The Committee Report
invoked “centuries [of] the law of fiduciaries” when explaining what would become 29
U.S.C. § 501. H.R. REP. NO. 86-741, at 10 (1959). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY (1958), was cited as a source for the statute’s description of the fiduciary duties of
union officers “in an effort to incorporate the whole body of common law precedents
defining the fiduciary obligations of agents and trustees with such adaptations as might be
required to take into account ‘the special problems and functions of a labor organization.’”
Cox, supra note 168, at 828 (internal footnote omitted).
171. Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233, 298 (D. Minn.), aff’d 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir.
1963).
172. Id.; see also McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1162 (7th Cir. 1975)
(following by analogy the precedents of shareholder derivative cases).
173. H.R. REP. NO. 86-741, at 81 (1959) (dictating the supplementary views of Rep.
Elliott, among others).
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be construed as “taking into account the special problems and functions of
a labor organization.” 174 An example of a court doing that is Morrissey v.
Curran, 175 where the Second Circuit rejected corporate law’s lenient
business judgment rule for evaluating allegations that the defendant union
officers’ compensation was excessive. The court highlighted three
distinctions between unions and corporations in this context: first, that exit
is much more difficult for union members than for shareholders; second,
that there are fewer market forces working to constrain union abuses than
there are checking abuses by corporate management; and third, that there
are no union counterparts to outside directors setting the compensation of
union officers. 176
§ 501(b) creates the union members’ derivative cause of action to seek
remedies, on behalf of the union, for fiduciary breaches when the union
refuses to bring suit on its own after being requested to do so.177 If
successful, plaintiffs can recover “for the benefit of the labor organization”
damages, an accounting, or “other appropriate relief,” including injunctive
relief and attorneys fees.178
When Congress modeled the union member derivative suit on
shareholder derivative actions, 179 those suits were viewed as “the most
important procedure the law has yet developed to police the internal affairs
of corporations.” 180 As the Supreme Court described them, shareholder
derivative suits were “long the chief regulator of corporate

174. 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2013).
175. 650 F.2d 1267, 1274-75 (2d Cir. 1981).
176. Id. at 1273-74. Another distinction noted by the court, this time between unions
and trusts, was that “union goals of advancing membership interests would result in
economic policies or decisions different from those expected of a traditional trustee, whose
sole legitimate aim is to preserve the trust corpus.” Id. at 1275.
177. 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2013). The fiduciary duties in § 501 actions should be
distinguished from the types involved in duty of fair representation (DFR) litigation. § 501
cases are derivative actions and generally focus on matters of internal union governance or
union finances. DFR cases, on the other hand, are direct actions that involve the negotiation
of collective bargaining agreements or their enforcement through contractual grievance
procedures. OSBORNE, supra note 48, at 277-420.
178. 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2013).
179. More precisely, the drafters of the Elliot bill modeled much of what became § 501
on a recently enacted New York statute, N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 720-732 (McKinney), that had
modeled its union member derivative action on shareholder suits. See Michael J. Goldberg,
Present at the Creation: Clyde Summers and the Field of Union Democracy Law, 14 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 121, 134 (2010) (stating that the bill served as a model for Title V of
the LMRDA).
180. Eugene V. Rostow, To Whom and For What Ends Are Corporate Management
Responsible?, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46, 48 (Edward S. Mason ed.
1960) (quoted in Kenneth B. Davis, The Forgotten Derivative Suit, 61 VAND. L. REV. 387,
411 (2008)).
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management.” 181 In recent decades, corporate derivative suits, at least in
Delaware, have lost much ground to direct shareholder class actions
brought under state law and federal securities laws. 182 At the time
Congress enacted the LMRDA, however, private causes of action under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were still emerging, 183 and the class action
device in its modern form became available only after the 1966
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.184 Shareholder
derivative suits were where the action was with respect to litigation
remedies for many corporate governance problems.
Derivative actions are procedural devices for bringing claims on
behalf of the corporation or the union. But what of the substance of those
claims? On the shareholder side, derivative suits generally enforce
fiduciary duties established by state law.185 In theory, plaintiffs can assert
fiduciary claims based on a breach of either the duty of care or the duty of
loyalty. In practice, however, plaintiffs rarely prevail on duty of care
claims and bring relatively few of them. 186 This is in part because a
defendant’s conduct is measured against the very deferential business
judgment rule, and in part because liability is usually excused under
exculpatory clauses of corporate charters authorized by state law.187
Fiduciary claims based on a breach of the duty of loyalty, on the other
hand, constitute the bulk of shareholder derivative actions in Delaware,

181. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
182. Davis, supra note 180, at 413; see also Randall S. Thomas, The Evolving Role of
Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance and Corporate Litigation, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 299, 305 (2008) (explaining that the number of derivative suits has decreased over the
last few years). But see Jessica Erickson, The New Professional Plaintiffs in Shareholder
Litigation, 65 FLA. L. REV. at 1089, 1016 (2013) (indicating a possible shift back towards
derivative suits).
183. See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (establishing a
private cause of action for Rule 10b-5 violations); see also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426 (1964) (implying a private shareholder cause of action under section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
184. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of
Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1757 (2004).
185. DEMOTT, supra note 161, at 1-2 (Supp. 2010-2011).
186. See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 60-61 (1991) (explaining that plaintiffs win less than six percent of
cases, none of which awarded damages or equitable relief); Thompson & Thomas, supra
note 184, at 1773, 1775-76 (weighing the risks and benefits of bringing a derivative action
and concluding that the low rate of success deters such actions from being brought).
187. See Davis, supra note 180, at 405 (“While the right of recovery for breakdowns of
judgment or oversight may have been more theoretical than real, it no longer even exists in
theory.”). But see Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An
Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749, 1774 (2010) (showing that duty of care
claims are still common in the context of derivative suits in the federal courts).
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although a smaller portion of the derivative actions brought in federal
court. 188
On the union side, the statute rather than the common law defines the
fiduciary duties of union officials. 189 However, the statutory language is
sufficiently general that courts have concluded, “Congress made no attempt
to ‘codify’ the law in this area. . . . [It] intended the federal courts to
fashion a new federal labor law in this area . . . .” 190 The statute is quite
specific, on the other hand, that general exculpatory provisions in union
constitutions or bylaws are void as against public policy. 191 This differs
from the corporate laws of most states, which expressly permit corporate
charters to contain provisions relieving directors of liability for duty of care
violations. 192
In union member derivative suits challenging union expenditures, the
courts generally uphold expenditures properly authorized pursuant to the
union’s constitution and bylaws when the defendant officers have no
personal stake in the expense.193 When the defendants are personally
188. See, e.g., Erickson, supra note 187, at 1778 (noting that shareholders were likely to
“reserv[e] state court claims for more traditional duty of loyalty claims.”); Thompson &
Thomas, supra note 184, at 1773 (“[A]lmost 60 percent of the complaints [in state court]
raise principally a duty of loyalty claim.”).
189. 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2013) provides in pertinent part:
The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor
organization occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and its
members as a group. It is, therefore, the duty of each such person, taking into
account the special problems and functions of a labor organization, to hold its
money and property solely for the benefit of the organization and its members
and to manage, invest, and expend the same in accordance with its constitution
and bylaws and any resolutions of the governing bodies adopted thereunder, to
refrain from dealing with such organization as an adverse party or in behalf of
an adverse party in any matter connected with his duties and from holding or
acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with the interests of
such organization, and to account to the organization for any profit received by
him in whatever capacity in connection with transactions conducted by him or
under his direction on behalf of the organization.
190. See Highway Truck Drivers Local 107 v. Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608, 617 (E.D. Pa.),
aff’d, 284 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1960), quoted in Johnson v. Nelson, 325 F.2d 646, 650-51 (8th
Cir. 1963), and Morrissey v. Curran, No. 69 Civ. 442, 1972 WL 1051 at *6, *7 (S.D.N.Y.
June 29, 1972), aff’d, 483 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1973). The Cohen court drew an analogy to the
federal common law of collective bargaining developed under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act,
29 U.S.C. § 185. 182 F. Supp. at 617, citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957).
191. 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2013).
192. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 102(b)(7) (2014) (permitting a charter provision
limiting the liability of a director who breaches her fiduciary duty of loyalty); MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(3) (2010) (allowing any provision that is permitted to be included in
the bylaws to also be included in the charter).
193. See, e.g., Gabauer v. Woodcock, 594 F.2d 662, 669-70 (8th Cir. 1979) (upholding
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interested, however, the expenditure must be reasonable, and some courts
put the burden on the defendants to demonstrate that reasonableness.194
Typical claims might be for abusing expense accounts; 195 providing
excessive compensation; 196 or remedying many other creative ways of
stealing from union treasuries or pension funds.197 Financial abuses
covered by § 501 need not directly line officers’ pockets. It is sufficient for
those abuses to more firmly entrench the offenders in office.198
The biggest question about the reach of union members’ derivative
suits is whether the defendants can be found liable for fiduciary breaches
that do not directly involve union property or finances.199 In a longstanding
split in the circuits, the Second Circuit has read § 501(a) narrowly, limiting
it to claims involving union property or finances.200 The remaining circuits
expenditures because they “were clearly authorized by the union’s constitution and
resolutions of the union’s national convention” and noting the outcome would have been
different if a conflict of interest existed.). Conversely, failure to follow proper authorization
procedures generally results in liability, because § 501(a) expressly requires union officials
“to manage, invest, and expend [union money and property] in accordance with its
constitution and bylaws and any resolutions of the governing bodies adopted thereunder.”
Id. at 666. Where a determination whether an expenditure was properly authorized requires
an interpretation of the union’s constitution or bylaws, the courts give great deference to the
union’s interpretation, so long as it is reasonable and was not made in bad faith. Monzillo v.
Biller, 735 F.2d 1456, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
194. See, e.g., Brink v. DaLesio, 667 F.2d 420, 424 (4th Cir. 1981) (relying on
Morrissey v. Curran, 650 F.2d 1267, 1274-75 (2d. Cir. 1981) for the proposition that “the
official bears the burden of proving that the transaction was validly authorized in
accordance with the union’s constitution and bylaws after adequate disclosure, and that it
does not exceed a fair range of reasonableness.”).
195. See, e.g., Noble v. Sombrotto, 525 F.3d 1230, 1235-37 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
196. See, e.g., Brink v. DaLesio, 667 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1981).
197. See, e.g., Hood v. Journeymen Barbers, 454 F.2d 1347 (7th Cir. 1972) (indicating
union officials’ fiduciary duties under § 501 extend to their roles as administrators or
trustees of union controlled pension or benefit funds). But see OSBORNE, supra note 48, at
146 (asserting union officials’ fiduciary duties under § 501 does not to their similar roles
with respect to jointly administered collectively bargained pension or benefit plans).
198. See, e.g., Guzman v. Bevona, 90 F.3d 641, 645 (2d Cir. 1996) (spending over
$19,000 to conduct surveillance of outspoken member violates officers’ duty “to hold [the
union’s] money and property solely for the benefit of the organization and its members”);
Wade v. Teamsters Local 247, 527 F. Supp. 1169 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (spending union funds
on an unlawful mail referendum to prevent consideration of dissident members’ proposed
bylaws amendments).
199. See OSBORNE, supra note 48, at 147-54 (discussing a narrow and broad approach to
union officials’ fiduciary obligations).
200. See, e.g., Gurton v. Aarons, 339 F.2d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 1964) (stressing that most
of the specific language of § 501(a) focuses on union property and finances; much of the
legislative history focused on financial abuses exposed by the McClellan Committee, and
expressed concern about too much judicial interference in union affairs); see also Head v.
Ry. Clerks, 512 F.2d 398, 401 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that § 501(a) concerns “the
fiduciary duties of union officers solely in terms of their treatment of the money and
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that have clearly addressed the issue have given the provision a broad
reading. They rely on the broadly drafted first sentence of § 501(a) 201 and
on the Committee Report on the Elliott bill. 202 Thus, courts have
recognized claims where officers violated their union constitutions by
failing to submit collective bargaining agreements, constitutional
amendments, or other matters to membership votes, 203 failing “to keep the
membership informed on matters which they, the rank and file, must
decide”, 204 failing to disband local unions with fewer than ten members, 205
failing to hold required membership meetings, 206 rigging officer
elections, 207 and failing to protect members’ democratic rights under the
LMRDA. 208
There do not appear to be many shareholder derivative suits
comparable to these union member suits that are unrelated to the
property of the union and their financial dealings vis-à-vis the union.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
201. “The officers . . . of a labor organization occupy positions of trust in relation to
such organization and its members as a group.” 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2013).
202. H. REP. NO. 86-741, at 81 (1959). According to the supplemental views of Elliott
and others:
We affirm that the committee bill is broader and stronger than the provisions of
S. 1555 . . . [which] applied the fiduciary principle to union officials only in
their handling of ‘money or other property’ . . . . [T]he committee bill extends
the fiduciary principle to all the activities of union officials and other union
agents or representatives.
Id. (emphasis added).
203. See, e.g., Stelling v. Int’l Bhd. Elec. Workers Local Union No. 1547, 587 F.2d
1379, 1387 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that “[t]he allegation that [the officers] have denied the
membership of the union the constitutionally guaranteed right to vote is a sufficient
assertion of a breach of trust on the part of the [the officers] to invoke the jurisdiction of
section 501.”).
204. Blanchard v. Johnson, 388 F. Supp. 208, 214 (N.D. Ohio 1975), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part, on other grounds, 532 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1976).
205. Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245, 1250-51 (3d Cir. 1972). The issue here is
not just the inefficiency of maintaining barely functioning or non-functioning locals. There
are union democracy implications as well. On some matters, union voting can be conducted
on a one-local, one-vote basis, rather than one-member, one-vote, meaning that incumbent
national officers can inflate their votes on those matters by maintaining and controlling
empty “paper” locals.
206. See Wade v. Teamsters Local 247, 527 F. Supp. 1169 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (holding
that a failure to hold requisite monthly membership meetings can be a violation of the union
constitution and is actionable under § 501).
207. See Hearn v. McKay, 184 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2817, 2826 (S.D. Fla. 2008), aff’d on
other grounds, 603 F.3d 897 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that election-related claims are
actionable under § 501, especially where a plaintiff is not aiming to set aside an election).
208. O’Rourke v. Crosley, 847 F. Supp. 1208, 1221 (D.N.J. 1994), citing Semancik v.
United Mine Workers Dist. 5, 466 F.2d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 1972) (stating that union officers
have a fiduciary duty under “Section 501 . . . to insure the political rights of all union
members.”).
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organizations’ finances, although it would seem shareholders can bring
them. Directors or officers who have violated their corporate charters or
bylaws in ways not directly affecting the corporate treasury have
presumably nevertheless violated their fiduciary duties by doing so, even in
the absence of financial harm to the corporation.209 Moreover, such
defendants could lose the protection of the business judgment rule if their
primary motivation was perpetuating themselves in control of the
corporation, thus violating their duty of loyalty. 210 In theory, many of these
claims could be brought as derivative suits, but in practice, direct actions
are far preferable because they avoid the procedural hurdles associated with
shareholder derivative actions. 211
In both the union and corporate contexts, direct and derivative claims
can be brought within a single case, 212 but the combination is more likely to
be seen in union litigation. A combination of claims is more likely because
the screening union member derivative suits receive is not nearly as lethal
as that faced by plaintiff shareholder suits. Moreover, union members have
not always had direct access to federal court to remedy violations of union
constitutions or bylaws, 213 so derivative actions were sometimes the only
alternative. 214

209. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006)
(“[T]he fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases involving financial or other
cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest. . . . Where directors fail to act in the face of a
known duty to act, thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibilities,
they breach their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good
faith.”) (internal citations omitted).
210. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387 (Del. 1995) (noting that
where a director’s primary motivation is to perpetuate herself in office, she might fail the
proportionality test of the business judgment rule).
211. See infra text accompanying notes 233-239.
212. See, e.g., Guzman v. Bevona, 90 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 1996); Stelling v. Int’l Bhd.
Elec. Workers Local Union No. 1547, 587 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1979) (combining, in the
union context, direct claims under 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 with derivative claims under §
501); 3 COX & HAZEN, supra note 40, § 15:3 n.23 (citing and discussing, in the corporate
context, shareholder cases permitting similar joinder).
213. See, e.g., Smith v. United Mine Workers, 493 F.2d 1241 (10th Cir. 1974) (asserting
that before the Supreme Court’s ruling for plaintiffs in Woodell v. Int’l Bhd. Elec. Workers
Local 71, 502 U.S. 93 (1991), a number of circuits had denied federal subject matter
jurisdiction to direct member suits seeking to enforce union constitutions and bylaws.) The
Court in Smith v. United Mine Workers construed § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, as applying
only to disputes directly impacting labor management relations, not to internal union
disputes. 493 F.2d at 1243-44. See also Korzen v. Local Union 705, Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 75 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1996) (maintaining that some courts, even after
Woodell, 502 U.S. 93, have held that while section 301 provides jurisdiction for suits based
on national union constitutions, it does not for suits based on local unions constitutions or
bylaws).
214. For example, in Stelling v. Int’l Bhd. Elec. Workers Local Union No. 1547, 587
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B. Procedural Filters and Roadblocks
Part of what makes the comparison between shareholder and union
member derivative suits interesting are the different paths the two types of
cases took after the union member variation was created in the image of the
shareholder suit more than fifty years ago. Union member suits have
changed very little, but shareholder derivative actions during that period
have morphed significantly. This is true not only in terms of their smaller
role in the regulation of corporate governance,215 but even more so with
respect to procedural changes that have the effect of blocking most
shareholder derivative actions altogether.216
When Congress created the union member derivative suit in 1959, it
sought to protect union officers from harassment and strike suits, and to
protect unions from too much interference from the courts.217 Of course,
courts have long had comparable concerns about shareholder derivative
actions. 218 Not surprisingly, the solutions chosen by Congress for § 501
actions were similar to the responses developed by the courts in the
corporate context.

F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1979), union members challenged the failure of local and national
officers to conduct a contract ratification vote before entering into an agreement with an
employers’ association, as plaintiffs alleged the union constitution required. On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit first held that it had no section 301 jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ direct claim
that the defendants’ conduct violated the union’s constitution. Id. at 1384. Then the court
held that the plaintiffs could not bring a direct action enforcing the LMRDA’s guarantee of
equal voting rights, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1), because the union did not discriminate against
them with respect to their voting rights; it treated all members equally by denying all of
them the right to vote. Id. at 1384-85. In the end, plaintiffs’ only basis for a remedy in
federal court was a derivative claim under 29 U.S.C. § 501. Id. at 1386-87.
215. See supra text accompanying note 182.
216. There is a bit of a chicken and egg phenomenon here. Have new procedural
obstacles brought about the reduced role of shareholder derivative suits, or has the
emergence of alternative corporate governance remedies created a legal environment where
a reduced role for derivative actions is more acceptable as a matter of public policy? Cf.
Davis, supra note 180, at 450 (“For [c]orporate [i]mpropriety, efficient securities markets,
media scrutiny, and public enforcement combine to provide shareholders with much of the
protection traditionally associated with the derivative suit, without the cost and distraction
associated with nuisance litigation.”).
217. See Highway Truck Drivers v. Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608, 622 n.10 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
aff’d, 284 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1961) (explaining that the “good cause” requirement under 29
U.S.C. § 501(b) is intended to stop frivolous litigation); R. Theodore Clark, Jr., The
Fiduciary Duties of Union Officials Under Section 501 of the LMRDA, 52 MINN. L. REV.
437, 465 (1967) (quoting Highway Truck Drivers, 182 F.Supp. at 622 n.10 to support the
same interpretation of “good cause” in 29 U.S.C. § 501(b)).
218. See Bert S. Prunty, Jr., The Shareholders’ Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation,
32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 983-84 (1957) (citing examples of courts favoring the selfgovernment of corporations rather than judicial interference).

GOLDBERG _FINAL (ARTICLE 2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

434

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

3/25/2015 8:11 PM

[Vol. 17:2

In both settings, plaintiffs must give the corporation or union,
operating through its officers or board, the opportunity to bring its own
lawsuit against the officers or board members who have allegedly breached
their fiduciary duties, or to otherwise remedy the underlying problem. 219 In
both settings, this demand requirement may be excused where the plaintiffs
can show that it would be a futile gesture, typically due to conflicts of
interest on the part of the corporate or union officials responding to the
demand. 220
The LMRDA does not specify a particular format for the demand, and
courts recognize that union members are often unsophisticated and, at the
demand stage, unrepresented by counsel.221 The courts therefore construed
the demand requirement liberally, finding it satisfied where the member
raised complaints about the offending officers’ misconduct and sought
action on the part of the union without spelling out a request that the union

219. See, e.g., Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23.1 (governing actions brought against the corporation);
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (2010) (laying out the formalities for a derivative action to
be brought against the corporation). 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) provides in relevant part:
When any officer, agent, shop steward, or representative of any labor
organization is alleged to have violated the duties declared in subsection (a) and
the labor organization or its governing board or officers refuse or fail to sue or
recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief within a
reasonable time after being requested to do so by any member of the labor
organization, such member may sue such officer, agent, shop steward, or
representative in any district court of the United States or in any State court . . .
to recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief for the
benefit of the labor organization.
220. In Delaware, the standard for excusing demand is whether the facts alleged create a
reasonable doubt “‘that . . . the directors are disinterested or independent’” or that “‘the
challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment.’”
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000) (citations omitted). In Delaware, once a
plaintiff has made a demand, he or she cannot later contend that demand should be excused
as futile. Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 775 (Del. 1990). Thus, plaintiffs in Delaware
tend to forgo making any demand at all. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 184, at 1782. In
most other states, and according to the Model Act, demand must be made in every case,
unless excused by the likelihood of irreparable harm while awaiting a response. MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (2010). In those states, however, a board’s rejection of plaintiff’s
demand will not be entitled to the judicial deference of the business judgment rule, and will
therefore not block the plaintiff from proceeding with the derivative suit, if that decision
was made by directors who are not disinterested or independent. On the union side, there is
a split in the circuits on whether circumstances demonstrating the futility of making the
demand might excuse the demand requirement altogether.
Compare Flaherty v.
Warehousemen, Garage & Serv. Station Employees Local 334, 574 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1978)
(stating that futility is no reason to excuse the demand requirement) with Sabolsky v.
Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1972) (excusing the demand requirement when it is
demonstrated that doing so may be futile).
221. Dinko v. Wall, 531 F.2d 68, 73 (2d. Cir. 1976).
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file suit. 222 In the corporate setting, on the other hand, the demand must
specifically request that the board take legal action on behalf of the
corporation, and any ambiguity is likely to be resolved against the
plaintiff. 223
There was initially some uncertainly whether union plaintiffs in
derivative suits had to satisfy a prerequisite for most other types of member
litigation: that plaintiffs exhaust any additional internal union remedies
that may be available, or demonstrate that exhaustion would be futile.224
Exhaustion usually means filing internal union charges against offending
officers or pursuing any internal union appeals available under the union’s
constitution. The consensus now is that § 501(b)’s demand requirement is
the only form of exhaustion required, 225 although some courts consider
exhaustion of further union remedies as part of the court’s determination
that plaintiffs have good cause to pursue their derivative claims. 226
Virtually all union member derivative suits are brought in federal
court, 227 but despite their similarity to shareholder derivative suits, only one
case has ever held they are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23.1. 228 While the rule’s drafters presumably did not have union member
suits in mind, 229 its text is consistent with its application: “This rule applies

222. See, e.g., Cowger v. Rohrbach, 868 F.2d 1064, 1067 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining
that a request satisfies the demand requirement even if it is only made in general terms).
223. DEMOTT, supra note 161, at 5-23, 5-44.
224. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (2013) (explaining that exhaustion is typically
required for a period of four months before filing a claim under the LMRDA’s bill of rights
for union members); Clayton v. United Auto Workers, 451 U.S. 679 (1981) (stating that
exhaustion is typically required in duty of fair representation litigation).
225. See, Cowger, 868 F.2d at 1066 (holding that exhaustion of internal union remedies
prior to filing a § 501 complaint is not required).
226. See, Sabolsky, 457 F.2d at 1252 (stating that exhausting other internal remedies
might affect the “good cause” requirement).
227. Plaintiffs can file in state or federal court under § 501(b) but a Westlaw search
revealed no reported state cases brought pursuant to § 501(b). This may be because
plaintiffs’ lawyers in these cases prefer federal court, or because cases brought in state court
are routinely removed to federal court by the defendants. To the extent there are state law
remedies for union officer breaches of fiduciary duty, the LMRDA does not preempt them.
See 29 U.S.C. § 523(a) (referring to both state and federal law as controlling). But such
remedies for the most part have lain dormant since the LMRDA’s enactment.
228. Martinez v. Barasch, No. 01 Civ. 2289, 2004 WL 1555191, *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 12,
2004). Other courts have on occasion looked to interpretations of FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 for
guidance without holding that the rule applies directly to § 501 cases. See, e.g., Hood v.
Journeymen Barbers, Hairdressers & Cosmetologists Int’l Union, 454 F.2d 1347, 1354 n.23
(7th Cir. 1972) (stating the demand requirement of Rule 23.1 is not always necessary).
229. Rule 23.1 had its origins in Equity Rules 27 and 94, which applied only to
shareholder derivative actions. 7C CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY K.
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1821, at 15-16 (3d ed. 2007). When
Equity Rule 27 became Rule 23(b) in the new Federal Rules in 1938, however, its language
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only when one or more shareholders or members of a corporation or an
unincorporated association bring a derivative action to enforce a right the
corporation or association may properly assert but has failed to enforce.” 230
On the other hand, most shareholder derivative suits to which Rule 23.1
applies are state law based claims brought in federal court on diversity of
citizenship grounds, whereas union member suits are based on a federal
statute which, one could argue, contains all the procedural prerequisites
Congress thought necessary. The most important impact of Rule 23.1 on §
501 claims would be the requirement that settlements be approved by the
court, after notice to the union’s members. 231 The rule’s remaining
requirements would be unnecessary in light of section 501(b)’s demand
requirement and its additional requirement that plaintiffs obtain, upon a
verified application, leave of the court to file their action. 232
When shareholders or union members make the required demand on
the appropriate corporate or union officials, what usually happens is a
refusal to proceed. 233 This is not surprising, because unless there has been
a change in the organization’s leadership, the demand––sometimes known
as a “go sue yourself” letter 234––often must be made upon individuals who
are close allies of the offending actors, and perhaps even upon the
offending actors themselves.
was broadened to cover unincorporated associations as well as corporations, although
plaintiffs were still characterized as shareholders. 5 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE §
23.1App.01, at 23.1App.-1 (3d ed. 2005). That change, of course, was made long before the
LMRDA’s enactment in 1959. In 1966, when Rule 23(b) became Rule 23.1, its language
was again broadened, this time expressly recognizing “members” of unincorporated
associations as potential plaintiffs. Id. § 23.1App.04, at 23.1App.-6.
230. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a) (emphasis added). Shareholder derivative plaintiffs in
federal court must, according to Rule 23.1(a), “fairly and adequately represent the interests
of shareholders or members who are similarly situated in enforcing the right of the
corporation or association.” Rule 23.1(b) also requires the complaint to be verified and to
“allege that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction
complained of” and “that the action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction.” The
complaint must also “state with particularity” the plaintiff’s efforts “to obtain the desired
action from the directors or comparable authority” and “the reasons for not obtaining the
action or not making the effort.” Finally, Rule 23.1(c) provides that any settlement of the
case must be approved by the court after notice to the shareholders or members.
231. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(c).
232. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(2)’s concern about collusive jurisdiction is not applicable
because LMRDA claims raise federal questions for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction.
233. See 3 COX & HAZEN, supra note 40, § 15:7 (explaining the difficulty in making a
demand on directors includes the discretion of the directors to refuse to sue based on the
business judgment rule).
234. The author first heard that description of demand letters in the union context from
Ken Paff, head of the rank-and-file reform caucus Teamsters for a Democratic Union. Cf. 3
COX & HAZEN, supra note 40, at § 15:7 (“directors cannot be expected to sue themselves in
order to enforce corporate rights.”) (internal footnote omitted).
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What happens then? Here is where the most dramatic changes have
taken place since the LMRDA’s enactment in 1959. At that time, if
corporate officers or directors refused a demand from potential derivative
plaintiffs, the courts ended up being the gatekeepers. The courts filtered
out shareholder claims that were abusive, frivolous, or otherwise would do
the corporation––the real party in interest––no good. 235 Therefore, § 501
requires that before a union member derivative suit can proceed, the court
must formally give its blessing, “upon verified application and for good
cause shown.” 236
That is still how the screening of derivative suits on the union side
works. In the corporate arena, however, a new player emerged in the mid1970’s: the special litigation committee.237 These devices operate to keep
the courts at arms length in the screening process. Instead, it is a
committee of the corporation’s independent directors, sometimes with the
assistance of independent counsel, who in effect get the last word on
whether or not a derivative suit can proceed.238 The result is that

235. See generally Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a
Derivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REV. 746 (1960) (discussing court’s broad conception of the
demand requirement). In carrying out their screening function, courts frequently considered
the merits of the plaintiffs’ allegations, even in demand-required cases. Carol B. Swanson,
Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the
Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1356 (1993).
236. 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2013). The circuits have divergent views as to what
constitutes good cause, turning mostly on whether plaintiffs must demonstrate a likelihood
of success on the merits. Compare Loretangeli v. Critelli, 853 F.2d 186, 191 (3d Cir. 1988)
(rejecting the likelihood of success standard on grounds that it “permits summary
elimination of meritorious as well as vexatious suits.”) and Erkins v. Bryan, 663 F.2d 1048,
1053 (11th Cir. 1981) (explaining that courts can consider whether plaintiffs are union
members or the claim is barred by the statute of limitations or res judicata, but should not
consider the substance of the case) with Hoffman v. Kramer, 362 F.3d 308, 319 (5th Cir.
2004) (holding that plaintiffs must show “some evidence exists” supporting their claims,
that the remedies sought “would realistically benefit the union,” and that the union’s
rejection of plaintiffs’ demand “was objectively unreasonable”) and Dinko v. Wall, 531
F.2d 68, 75 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that plaintiff must show a reasonable likelihood of
success).
237. See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 486 (1979) (holding that independent
directors have the authority to halt a derivative suit as long as it is consistent with certain
federal legislation); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 516-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(discussing the power of the special committee’s judgment).
238. Even in situations where a demand would be excused because a majority of
directors is implicated in the challenged transaction, a special litigation committee
comprised of uninvolved, independent directors can move to have the derivative suit
dismissed, and courts, applying the business judgment rule, generally grant those motions.
See 3 COX & HAZEN, supra note 40, § 15:8 (explaining that special committees were created
to enable disinterested parties to determine the corporation’s interest in a derivative suit
when the board is otherwise self-interested).

GOLDBERG _FINAL (ARTICLE 2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

438

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

3/25/2015 8:11 PM

[Vol. 17:2

procedures that started out as filters––and that remain so for union member
derivative cases––have now become often insurmountable roadblocks. 239
Nothing comparable to special litigation committees––even
recognizing the structural bias that can undermine the objectivity of
independent directors serving on them 240––operates on the union side to
stop officers directly or indirectly targeted by § 501 suits from deciding
what the union’s response to a demand letter should be. Thus, there is a
greater need for courts to play the principal gatekeeper role in determining
whether there is good cause for the case to proceed. The closest analogies
to independent, or outside directors in unions would be individuals who are
asked to serve on Public Review Boards in the handful of unions that have
them. 241 Other analogies can be drawn to individuals serving as court
appointed monitors of various types pursuant to RICO consent decrees, 242
or as “Ethical Practices Counsel” in unions that have voluntarily created
such positions. 243
There are other differences between shareholder and union member
derivative suits that also help explain why procedures that are still filters on
the union side have become roadblocks for shareholder plaintiffs. The
most important are probably the enormous differences in scale, with respect

239. For recent studies of the responses of special litigation committees to shareholder
demands, see Erickson, supra note 187, at 1786 (“[b]y and large, the SLC’s . . .
recommended dismissal of the claims.”) and Minor Myers, The Decisions of the Corporate
Special Litigation Committees: An Empirical Investigation, 84 IND. L.J. 1309, 1311 (2009)
(noting that SLC’s “sought some form of formal relief much more frequently than
heretofore recognized.”).
240. See generally Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation
Committees, and the Vagaries of Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1305 (2005)
(arguing that structural bias can weaken the objectivity of independent directors); Julian
Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 821
(2004) (recognizing that the central problem of structural bias must be addressed).
241. The United Automobile Workers is the leading union with an Independent Review
Board, which functions as the union’s supreme court for intra-union grievances and is the
ultimate arbiter of alleged violations of the union’s Ethical Practices Code. Over the years
its members have included a former Secretary of Labor, NLRB General Counsel, and
Solicitor General, as well as many prominent academics. Goldberg, supra note 18, at 92325;
Public
Review
Board
Members,
UAW
PUBLIC
REVIEW
BOARD
http://www.uawpublicreviewboard.com/prb/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
242. See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 18, at 143 (noting how negotiated consent decrees,
that include appointment of a trustee or monitor, are a common resolution to civil RICO
labor racketeering cases).
243. See, e.g., INT’L LONGSHOREMEN’S ASS’N, CODE OF ETHICS 5-6 (2007), available at
http://www.ilaunion.org/pdf/CodeOfEthics.pdf (explaining the purpose of establishing an
ethical practices counsel). A cynic might wonder whether the ILA created this position to
head off more intrusive remedies that could result from a pending civil RICO case. Second
Amended Complaint, United States v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, No. CV-05-3212
(E.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 2, 2008).
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to both potential damages and attorneys’ fee awards. In shareholder suits,
damage awards can reach into the billions of dollars, and attorneys’ fees
into the hundreds of million.244 Nothing of that magnitude is even
imaginable in union litigation, which lowers the incentive for plaintiffs or
their lawyers to bring even meritorious claims, much less strike suits.
Moreover, while the costs of litigating union cases tend to be smaller,
it is still difficult for most union members, or their lawyers when they can
find them, to finance such litigation until a victory or favorable settlement
is obtained. 245 Perhaps because potential payoffs are so much smaller, no
plaintiffs’ bar specializing in § 501 litigation has ever emerged. In
addition, the plaintiffs are still members of the unions whose officers they
are suing. This could make them potential targets for economic, or even
physical, retaliation, which would not be an irrational fear if their union has
been infiltrated by organized crime. 246 Finally, with far fewer unions than
there are corporations, even if other factors were the same, the volume of
union member derivative litigation would be far smaller than shareholder
cases. This reduces the pressure on crowded courts to tolerate, or actively
seek, ways to reduce the number of such cases on their dockets.
IV.

VARIATIONS ON A THEME

I came to this project from the union democracy side, firmly
committed to protecting and expanding the democratic rights of union
members, 247 and I anticipated that this article would take up the cause of
shareholder democracy as well. As one union president once explained:
[T]he individual union member, so poignantly depicted by
some . . . as captive of the “labor bosses,” has an infinitely better
chance to be heard . . . than all the little old ladies who hold
shares but are captive of the “corporation bosses.” Union
244. See, e.g., Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012) (awarding
more than $2 billion in damages and $304 million in attorneys’ fees). A major adjustment
to litigation incentives in Delaware may be underway following a decision which permitted
corporations to adopt fee-shifting bylaws that would require plaintiffs in unsuccessful
shareholder suits to reimburse the defendants for their defense costs. ATP Tour, Inc. v.
Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014); see also, Steven Davidoff Solomon, A
Ruling’s Chilling Effect on Corporate Litigation, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2014, 5:01 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/23/a-rulings-chilling-effect-on-corporatelitigation/?_r=0.
245. Michael J. Goldberg, The Duty of Fair Representation: What the Courts Do in
Fact, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 89, 143 n.198 (1985).
246. Goldberg, supra note 18, at 912-13.
247. I sit on the board of the Association for Union Democracy (AUD), a small
nonprofit that is the only organization devoted exclusively to the cause of union democracy.

GOLDBERG _FINAL (ARTICLE 2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

440

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

3/25/2015 8:11 PM

[Vol. 17:2

meetings are held before the event; stockholders’ meetings are
held after it, and the few individual dissidents are buried under an
avalanche of proxies. After all, there is no Landrum-Griffin act
for management. 248
True, those words were written before the emergence of institutional
investors on a large scale, before hostile takeovers became a potential
means for the market to discipline ineffective managers,249 and before the
reforms in corporate governance that followed Enron and the 2008
economic meltdown. Nevertheless, as a “small ‘d’” democrat committed to
democracy in the public sphere and in labor unions, I found it troubling that
virtually everyone who weighed in on the shareholder democracy debate,
regardless of the position taken, acknowledged that the shareholder
franchise is little more than a myth. 250
Recognizing that something is a myth, of course, does not necessarily
mean one would prefer it to be real. Not everyone who agrees that the
shareholder franchise has more significance in theory than in practice
believes that is a bad thing. 251 Much of the debate over proposals to
increase shareholder democracy turns on one’s answers to two questions.
First is the normative question of whose interests directors should serve––
exclusively those of shareholders, as the owners of the corporation, or the
interests of other stakeholders as well, including employees, creditors, and
the communities in which corporate facilities are located? Second is the
instrumental question of whether increasing shareholder influence and
decision-making authority in the corporation is an effective means of
assuring that directors will, in fact, properly serve the interests of

248. See JOSEPH A. BEIRNE, CHALLENGE TO LABOR: NEW ROLES FOR AMERICAN TRADE
UNIONS 209 (1969), quoted in Schwab, supra note 19, at 368 n.1 (quoting a former president
of the Communications Workers of America).
249. In recent years, the hostile takeover has become “virtually obsolete.” JONATHAN R.
MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 10 (2008).
250. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69 (arguing that the shareholder franchise
carries such little power in terms of corporate decision-making that it is hardly more than a
myth).
251. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1758 (explaining that empowering
shareholders would not have an overall positive effect); Bratton & Wachter, supra note 3, at
653 (describing how shareholder empowerment is not a proper response to the financial
crisis, but that the financial crisis actually exposed major weaknesses in the shareholder
empowerment case); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Legitimate Rights of Public Shareholders,
66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1635 (2009) (advocating for the position that public shareholders’
rights should ideally be eliminated and not expanded); Stout, supra note 3, at 792
(“reminding readers of the dangers of policymaking based on myth,” and that increasing
shareholder control would not benefit the economy).
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whomever is identified in the answer to the first question as the
stakeholders whose interests the board should serve. 252
A somewhat analogous debate within the labor movement is that
between “bread and butter” or “business unionism” on the one hand, and
“social movement unionism” on the other. 253 To some degree, that debate
is over means, 254 but like the debate over corporate social responsibility255
and team production models of the corporation,256 the debate in the labor
movement is also over ends. Does a union owe its primary duty to its
current members, or does it also have obligations to working people more
generally? 257 Even if its primary duty is to current members, to what extent
does organizing the unorganized, and promoting a particular social and
political agenda, help fulfill that duty? 258
To the extent that labor laws protecting union democracy were a
response to the corruption and labor racketeering exposed by the McClellan
Committee in the 1950’s, 259 and recent expansions of shareholder

252. For brief introductions to the various approaches to answering these questions, see
WALTER A. EFFROSS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 1-22 (2010)
(explaining the purposes and priorities of corporate governance) and FAIRFAX, supra note
39, at 35-43 (explaining the pros and cons of increased shareholder power).
253. See generally PAUL BUHLE, TAKING CARE OF BUSINESS: SAMUEL GOMPERS,
GEORGE MEANY, LANE KIRKLAND, AND THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN LABOR (1999)
(describing the history of that tension within the labor movement).
254. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the debate over means for improving the
lot of workers focused on a perceived choice between collective bargaining on the one hand,
and political action on the other. A more significant difference between business and social
movement unionism today is whether union functions like organizing, bargaining, and
waging strikes take a predominantly top down approach or one based on empowering the
membership more from the bottom up. In recent years, bitter fissures within and among
unions attempting to organize health care workers grew out of that fault line. See generally
STEVE EARLY, THE CIVIL WARS IN U.S. LABOR: BIRTH OF A NEW WORKERS’ MOVEMENT OR
DEATH THROES OF THE OLD? (2011).
255. See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S
NEWEST EXPORT 29-30 (2001) (arguing that corporations should be held accountable for
their actions, and that our initial design of them not being held accountable must change).
256. See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 2 (discussing team production theory and
when team production problems arise).
257. See Richard Michael Fischl, Self, Others, and Section 7: Mutualism and Protected
Protest Activities Under the National Labor Relations Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 789, 796-98
(1989) (explaining that there is some question whether union activity that is purely altruistic
is even protected under the National Labor Relations Act).
258. Cf. Eastex, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 437 U.S. 556 (1978) (holding that a
union’s support of a minimum wage increase was protected activity, even though the
union’s members earned more than the minimum, because the minimum wage influences
collectively bargained wages).
259. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12 (explaining the seriousness of that
corruption and comparing its impact on union democracy to that of the convictions of Enron
executives and Martha Stewart on corporate democracy).
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democracy were a reaction to corporate scandals like Enron,260 many of the
instrumental arguments in favor of more democracy are strikingly similar.
For example, the union democracy provisions of the LMRDA were seen as
a way to avoid heavy-handed governmental interference with the internal
affairs of unions by empowering union members to deal with the problems
of autocratic and corrupt leaders. As Senator McClellan explained, “I
believe that if you would give to the individual members of the unions the
tools with which to do it, they would pretty well clean house
themselves.” 261 Similarly, one of the leading advocates of expanded
shareholder democracy argues that once the shareholder franchise moves
from myth to reality, “shareholders will have ‘self-help’ tools to address
governance flaws, and public officials will have less need to intervene.”
Otherwise, “evidence that existing arrangements fail to provide adequate
checks necessarily calls for intervention by ‘outsiders’––be they legislators,
SEC officials, courts, or exchanges . . . .” 262
Instrumental arguments favoring more democracy in unions and
corporations are also similar in another way. In both contexts, proponents
contend that even apart from any reductions in corruption, scandal, or
malfeasance, more democracy leads to better performance in carrying out
these institutions’ basic functions––providing effective representation for
union members, and making money for shareholders. 263 The juries may
still be out, 264 but there are empirical studies in both fields lending credence
to those arguments. 265

260. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4 (noting the impact of the Enron scandal and
the 2008 financial crisis on demands for regulation of corporate governance and enhanced
shareholder democracy).
261. 105 CONG. REC. S5810 (daily ed. April 22, 1959) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
262. Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 870.
263. See, e.g., PARKER & GRUELLE, supra note 36, at 85, (describing why it is crucial to
labor that union members control the union); Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 836, (explaining that
giving shareholders more power will provide them with proper representation and improve
all corporate governance arrangements). It is noteworthy that during the period leading to
the passage of the LMRDA, some of the statute’s principal supporters, like Professor
Summers, who might be considered the father of union democracy law, did not stress that
greater internal democracy would strengthen unions. Instead, they pulled their punches, “to
avoid frightening off from the coalition supporting union reform legislation some of those
strange political bedfellows who were supporting the right legislative result for the wrong,
anti-union reasons.” Goldberg, supra note 179, at 130 (internal footnote omitted). After the
LMRDA was enacted, Professor Summers acknowledged that some of the statute’s support
came from “employers’ organizations which sought to weaken unions. In part, they hoped
that internal democracy would reduce the effectiveness of unions economically and
politically . . . .” Clyde W. Summers, American Legislation for Union Democracy, 25 MOD.
L. REV. 273, 278 (1962).
264. See STOUT, supra note 4, at 47-57 (explaining how, while there are no absolutely
clear results, there seem to be serious doubts regarding the supposed advantages of
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By the same token, the arguments against more democracy in unions
and corporations also have much in common. For example, most union
leaders opposed passage of the LRMDA as unduly burdensome and
intrusive, and some supporters of the labor movement had long feared that
too much democracy would play into management’s hands, weakening
labor at the bargaining table by undermining solidarity and promoting
factionalism. 266 One of the classic arguments is that a union going into an
organizing campaign, calling a strike, or trying to survive a lockout by
management, is like an army going into battle, and it must be led by a
shareholder primacy).
265. For studies of the effects of greater democracy on union effectiveness, see Robert
Bruno, Democratic Goods: Teamster Reform and Collective Bargaining Outcomes, 21 J.
LAB. RES. 83 (2000) (asserting that democratic decision-making procedures should be
implemented, as they will elicit membership input which will increase the ability of the
institution to represent its members’ interests); Jack Fiorito & Wallace E. Hendricks, Union
Characteristics and Bargaining Outcomes, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 569 (1987) (arguing
that there is strong evidence that union characteristics affect bargaining outcomes and that
democracy frequently alters the shape of the outcomes); Patricia M. Maranto & Jack Fiorito,
The Effect of Union Characteristics on the Outcome of NLRB Certification Elections, 40
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 225 (1987) (claiming that union success is positively influenced by
internal democracy). For studies on the corporate side, see Bo Becker, Daniel Bergstresser
& Guhan Subramanian, Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence
from the Business Roundtable’s Challenge, 56 J.L. & ECON. 127 (2013) (using the business
roundtable’s challenge to show that proxy access can cause a firm to lose value); James F.
Cotter, Alan R. Palmiter & Randall S. Thomas, The First Year of Say-on-Pay under DoddFrank: an Empirical Analysis and Look Forward, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 967 (2013)
(finding that the Dodd-Frank say-on-pay mandate has not broadly unleashed shareholder
opposition to executive compensation, but has only affected pay practices at outlier
companies experiencing weak performances); Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick,
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003) (finding that firms
with stronger shareholder rights had higher firm value); Reena Aggarwal, Jason Schloetzer
& Rohan Williamson, The Impact of Corporate Governance Mandates on Poorly Governed
Firms
(October
25,
2012)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2023879 (claiming that firms had lower value before complying
with corporate governance mandates compared to after their compliance).
266. See, e.g., Arthur J. Goldberg, A Trade Union Point of View, in LABOR IN A FREE
SOCIETY 102, 109 (Michael Harrington & Paul Jacobs eds., 1959) (noting that “permanent
factions that are desirable in political democracy” are intolerable for unions striving for
“collective-bargaining strength.”); A.J. Muste, Army and Town Meeting, in UNIONS,
MANAGEMENT, AND THE PUBLIC 187, 188-89 (E. Wright Bakke & Clark Kerr eds., 1948)
(juxtaposing an army general and a town hall chairman to illustrate the dilemma of the
union leader as he must listen to the views of the members while not letting factions form
that will harm union influence); Edwin S. Smith, The Case Against Regulation: An Answer
to the Demand for Regulation of Labor Unions, in FEDERAL REGULATION OF LABOR UNIONS
139-40 (J.V. Garland ed. 1941) (noting that industrialists would pray on badly run unions to
promote factionalism). While many union leaders undoubtedly make these arguments in
good faith, it must be acknowledged that incumbent union officers had in 1959, and still
have, a very personal stake in these issues as well, since laws promoting union democracy
necessarily make their continued tenure in office less secure.
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general, not a town meeting. 267 Minus the military imagery, 268 that sounds
a lot like one of the leading arguments against expanding shareholder
democracy:
Active investor involvement in corporate decisionmaking seems
likely to disrupt the very mechanism that makes the widely held
public corporation practicable: namely the centralization of
essentially nonreviewable decisionmaking authority . . . . The
chief economic virtue of the public corporation is . . . that it
provides a hierarchical decisionmaking structure well-suited to
the problem of operating a large business enterprise with
numerous employees, managers, shareholders, creditors, and
other constituencies. In such an enterprise, someone must be in
charge. 269
Another argument shared by skeptics about the value of shareholder
and union democracy is that there is so much rational apathy on the part of
shareholders and union members that electoral challenges to incumbent
slates of directors or officers and shareholder access to the proxy for
proposals of various sorts are so often futile that providing greater
opportunities for such access is simply not worth the cost.270 It is true, after
all, that, nearly always, in the settings of most national unions and most
public companies, any democracy present exists in a “one-party state.” 271
In such settings, “[t]he enormous advantages of the incumbents obviously
discourage potential challengers, and many . . . elections . . . go

267. See Muste, supra note 266, at 190 (noting that a union must unify its message to be
effective).
268. American labor history is rife with strikes that turned into pitched battles involving
strikers, armed security guards, police, and militia, making Muste’s military reference more
than just a metaphor––despite the fact that Muste himself was not just a labor leader; he was
also a lifelong pacifist. Jon Bloom, Muste, Abraham Johannes, in BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LABOR 264 (Gary M. Fink ed., rev. ed. 1984).
269. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1749.
270. See, e.g., Hutchison & Alley, supra note 98, at 949 (noting that “[r]ational
shareholders demand participation in their investments only when doing so (in the broadest
sense) are greater than the costs.”); Kahan & Rock, supra note 154, at 1231 (stating that the
“issues of shareholders’ rational apathy and free rider problems detract from the case for
shareholder voting.”).
271. See generally Clyde W. Summers, Democracy in a One-Party State: Perspectives
from Landrum-Griffin, 43 MD. L. REV. 93 (1984) (explaining that the law does not require a
two-party system and that unions, thus, will remain in one-party states). This is another
reason why a comparative study of corporate governance and union governance may be
more fruitful than comparisons between corporate governance and public government.
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uncontested. In contested elections the challengers seldom have a realistic
chance of winning, and the number of victories is small.” 272
Nevertheless, Professor Summers in defense of union democracy and
Professor Bebchuk and others in defense of shareholder democracy make
very similar arguments about the value of opportunities for union member
and shareholder voting despite its seeming futility. First, “although
challengers [and shareholder proposals] seldom win, they do not always
lose,” 273 so the “mere existence of viable shareholder [or union member]
power” to replace incumbent directors or officers “would often improve
matters . . . indirectly, by changing the incentives of incumbents. . . . The
benefits of reform . . . would not be limited to cases in which actual
contests, with their accompanying costs, take place.” 274 Similarly,
challenges that are attempted and lost can have important benefits to the
union or corporation:
[W]hen the votes are counted, the tabulation does more than
decide the winner. Although the incumbent wins, . . . [if
significant votes are cast] for the insurgents in spite of the
advantages favoring the incumbents, this signals a level of
dissatisfaction far beyond what the [incumbents] believed to exist
or want to continue. Practices and policies may be modified to
meet the criticism and lower the level of discontent. Although
the incumbent oligarchy stays in power, it becomes responsive to
the election returns. 275
Moreover, elections incumbents win by narrower than expected
margins can create a delayed reaction for democratic change by exposing
vulnerabilities that mark those incumbents as potential targets for perhaps
more successful challenges in the future. 276 Finally, whatever their
272. Id. at 105.
273. Id. at 106.
274. Bebchuk, supra note 39, at 719; see also Summers, supra note 271, at 106 (“Even
an occasional unseating keeps other officers aware that they cannot afford to be indifferent
to . . . their members; responsiveness is encouraged by the desire for self-preservation.”).
275. Summers, supra note 271, at 106; see also Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 878 (“[T]he
benefits of shareholder intervention power should not be measured solely, or even primarily,
by the rate of actual shareholder intervention. . . . Introducing the power to intervene would
induce management to act differently in order to avoid shareholder intervention.”).
276. See Summers, supra note 271, at 106-07 (arguing that close, contested elections
make incumbents more responsive, and that supporters of incumbents may be emboldened
to become challengers in future elections); see also Lee Harris, Corporate Elections and
Tactical Settlements, 39 J. CORP. L. 221, 226 (2013) (explaining that election data can
“reveal what types of boards of directors are vulnerable and . . . help[] clarify the type[s] of
targets that activist investors might move into their cross hairs.”).
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outcome, shareholder and union member votes provide valuable
opportunities, one hopes, for constructive debates on the incumbents’
integrity and judgment, as well as the organization’s strategic direction.277
In sum, the instrumental arguments for, and against, enhanced
shareholder and union member democracy are quite similar. But what of
the normative arguments? That is where my initial, “small ‘d’” almost
instinctive support for more shareholder democracy has given way to a
more agnostic position. 278 I remain receptive to the instrumental arguments
in favor of shareholder democracy as simply a set of tools in the corporate
governance toolbox that can be applied, and dialed up or dialed back as
appropriate, along with other tools like shareholder litigation, state
corporation laws, federal securities statutes and regulations, and the
business judgment rule that together, “like all of corporate law, reflects an
inherent tension between two competing values: the need to preserve the
board of directors’ decision-making discretion and the need to hold the
board accountable for its decisions.” 279
But accountable to whom? Who are these shareholders that would
benefit from shareholder democracy being valued as a norm, rather than as
a mere tool to further economic efficiency? Unlike union members or
citizens voting in the public sphere, shareholders are not necessarily even
human beings; they can be other corporations, mutual funds, pension plans,
hedge funds, and other entities.280 True, the ultimate investors in these
entities may be actual people, but despite the seeming democratization of
the stock market, with nearly half of all households directly or indirectly
owning stock, in 2007 half of those stock-owning households had
portfolios of less than $10,000. 281In fact:

277. See Harris, supra note 276, at 226 (“[P]eriodic challenges have a disciplinary effect
on managerial behavior [and] encourage debate regarding the firm’s strategic direction.”);
Summers, supra note 271, at 106 (explaining that elections bring about debates where
incumbents are challenged to justify their conduct and policies).
278. The cause of shareholder democracy has what Professors Bratton and Wachter
describe as “a progressive overlay”––an image, they argue, that is unjustified. William W.
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
489, 513 (2013); cf. Summers, supra note 21, at 611 (Americans “accept as faith that
democracy is not merely a device for governing the state but is an ethic which should
permeate all of life.”).
279. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 107 (2008); see also MACEY, supra note 249, at 209 (“It is far from clear that it
matters how poor performers are replaced. . . . [T]he result . . . is the same.”).
280. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 133, at 865 (stating that “institutional investors
owned over 70% of the outstanding stock of the thousand largest U.S. public corporations”
in 2011) (footnote omitted).
281. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 278, at 514, 516.
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The modal shareholder in the data is rich, old, and white. It
follows that there is nothing inherently democratic or progressive
about the shareholder interest in corporate politics. Indeed,
shareholder politics is better described as a contest between two
elite groups: corporate managers and investment intermediaries,
which act as delegees of the same elite class of shareholder
beneficiaries.282
Unions, on the other hand, may represent a small and shrinking
segment of the workforce,283 but in terms of income, race, age, and other
demographic characteristics, their members are much closer to being
representative of the population as a whole than are shareholders.284
Poison pills and other defensive tactics adopted by corporate boards to
fend off hostile takeovers are generally seen as anti-democratic, intended to
protect the incumbent boards and top management of takeover targets,
arguably at the expense of shareholders who might profit by high share
prices paid in a takeover, or by the supposedly better management that
would replace incumbents whose underperformance made the companies
takeover targets to begin with. But if, as Professors Bratton and Wachter
argue, these fights are largely power struggles within the same elite class,285
favoring shareholder democracy on normative, rather than on narrower
instrumental grounds, can have the result of pushing even further off the
management radar screen the interests of other corporate stakeholders, like
employees and the communities in which corporations are located. 286
282. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 278, at 491. Further complicating the normative
considerations is the influential role of proxy advisors like Institutional Investor Services in
shareholder votes. “[T]he separation of ‘ownership from ownership’ created by the
emergence of institutional investors is . . . exacerbated by the willingness of institutional
investors to defer to other agents” who neither “owe fiduciary duties to the corporations
whose policies they seek to influence” nor bear the same risks of poor voting decisions as
“the individual investors whose capital they use to wield influence.” Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for
Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1765 (2006). See generally
Tamara C. Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry: The Case
for Increased Oversight and Control, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 384, 438-39 (2009)
(criticizing Institutional Shareholder Services’ role in proxy voting).
283. In 2013, union density in private and public sector workplaces combined was 11.3
percent, down from 20.1 percent in 1983. News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union
Members — 2013 (Jan. 24, 2014) available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/
union2_01242014.pdf.
284. Id.
285. See supra text accompanying note 282 (arguing shareholders generally have
similar demographic characteristics).
286. State corporation laws, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(a)(1) (West 1990),
and court decisions often explicitly authorize directors to consider the impact of their
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To return for a moment to comparisons between corporate governance
and public government, as then Vice Chancellor––now Delaware Chief
Justice––Leo Strine wrote:
In the context of political elections, the ability to express oneself
freely at the ballot box has more than instrumental value. The
chance to have a say, to speak one’s mind, and to have a fair
chance to persuade others to one’s point of view about how to
govern the community is a legitimate end in itself. But the
traditionalist knows there is nothing sacred about the governance
of corporate entities. The right to elect directors is an important
tool for stockholders . . . . But the director election process is
only one of many methods by which accountability to
stockholder interests is assured . . . . 287
Democracy in union governance, on the other hand, has a much
greater claim to support on normative grounds, in addition to having some
of the instrumental benefits it shares with shareholder empowerment. One
important reason is the larger role a union plays in the daily lives of its
members, compared to the role a publicly traded corporation plays in the
lives of its typically diversified investors. Union members must usually
invest the bulk of their human capital in a single job, and their unions help
shape the very terms and conditions of those jobs. As Professor Summers
put it, the “public purpose of collective bargaining is the cornerstone of the
public interest in union democracy.” 288 Further:
With a union acting as their representative in collective
bargaining, workers . . . become participants with a voice in
business decisions “on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers,
employees, and perhaps even the community generally).” Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). Nevertheless, overemphasizing shareholder democracy
can mean that “[e]ven if directors are permitted by law to engage in socially responsible
behavior, they may fear retaliation for acting against the interests of the shareholders who
elect them.” Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 407, 461-62 (2006). The counterargument is that “[r]educing directors’ accountability
to shareholders . . . would increase the ability of directors to behave opportunistically
without increasing their incentives to attend to nonshareholder interests.” Id. at 462. A
different dynamic would be present in corporations certified as Benefit, or B Corporations,
organized with the intent of creating public benefits in addition to making profits. See
Hillary Howard, A New Yardstick for Socially Conscious Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/giving/a-new-yardstick-for-socially-consciouscompanies.html (noting the increased prevalence of B Corporations).
287. Strine, supra note 282, at 1776-77.
288. Summers, supra note 21, at 615.
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determining the terms and conditions of their employment, and to
at least this extent have a share in controlling the economic
system within which they live and work. . . . Once it is clearly
recognized that unions are economic legislatures engaged in
determining the laws by which men work . . . the importance of
guaranteeing workers the right to share in making those laws is
self-evident. 289
Another reason for valuing union democracy is labor’s role as a
political voice for its members. 290 There are very few organizations in
America, besides unions, that even purport to represent working people as
working people, not as taxpayers or consumers, in the political arena.291 In
light of that unique political role of unions, it is critical that the political
positions they take be reached through a democratic process. Without
internal democracy, the result can be what happened, for example, in 1984,
when the Teamsters union endorsed the reelection of President Ronald
Reagan, pursuant to a bogus mail referendum of the rank and file which the
union claimed favored Reagan by a ten point margin over Democratic
challenger Walter Mondale. Years later, the head of the union’s public
relations department admitted that the actual vote favored Mondale by

289. Clyde W. Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 33, 73-74
(1947).
290. For comparisons of the nature and legal treatment of union and corporate political
speech, see Matthew T. Bodie, Labor Speech, Corporate Speech, and Political Speech: A
Response to Professor Sachs, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 206, 207 (2012) (highlighting
the differences between union and corporate speech post Citizens United); Catherine L. Fisk
& Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights after Knox v. SEIU Local
1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2013) (describing how union speech is treated under
the First Amendment); Todd E. Pettys, Unions, Corporations, and the First Amendment: A
Response to Professors Fisk and Chemerinsky, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 23, 27 (July 22,
2013) (discussing recent court decisions regarding union speech); and Benjamin I. Sachs,
Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 800, 802 (2012) (noting how Citizens United changed how the courts view union and
corporate speech rights).
291. “The worker” has virtually disappeared from the social and political imagination,
replaced instead by the more amorphous figure of “the consumer,” whose interests are often
seen as conflicting with those of the worker. The irony, of course, is that consumers are for
the most part comprised primarily of workers or their dependents. RICK FONTANA & KIM
VOOS, HARD WORK: REMAKING THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 27 (2004). Historically,
the labor movement, together with its allies in the civil rights and women’s movements, has
been the most important and best-organized segment of the polity that has consistently
struggled for a more equitable distribution of wealth and power in society. See id. at 162
(discussing and giving examples of labor organizations’ social and political power);
RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 192 (1984) (noting ways
in which unions distribute political power).

GOLDBERG _FINAL (ARTICLE 2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

450

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

3/25/2015 8:11 PM

[Vol. 17:2

more than two-to-one before the union’s staff discarded thousands of
Mondale votes and stuffed the ballot boxes with phony Reagan votes.292
Beyond electoral politics, unions are important mediating
organizations in civil society helping to protect and insulate individuals
from overreaches by the state and by large corporations. 293 Unions, if
democratic themselves, are “‘schools for democracy’ where the habits of
self-governance and direct responsibility are instilled.” 294 In many ways,
“[c]itizens are not born; they are made,”295 and unions can serve as
“seedbeds of the civic virtues.” 296 This is a particularly important role for
unions because the workplace “is the chief (and . . . for many, the only)
place outside the family where people directly are involved in a common
undertaking.” 297 As Professor Estlund points out, “We may be ‘bowling
alone,’ but we are working together.” 298 Moreover, because of antidiscrimination laws, workplaces, and the unions that represent workers in
them, are among the most racially and ethnically integrated areas in our
society. 299
Unions can be part of the “civic infrastructure” that a democracy
requires. 300 As one labor educator explains, at least in unions that are
democratic and believe in empowering their members, union members:
[L]earn to develop strategies to change existing conditions in
their workplaces, neighborhoods, and in their unions. And they
will understand how to organize and mobilize themselves and
others for action as they evaluate and learn together. . . . Every
action of the union, such as bargaining for a new contract,
resolving a grievance, or conducting a job action, becomes a

292. F.C. DUKE ZELLER, DEVIL’S PACT: INSIDE THE WORLD OF THE TEAMSTERS UNION
127 (1996).
293. Cf. Barbara K. Bucholtz, Reflections on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a
Representative Democracy, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 555, 556 (1998) (arguing that the
nonprofit sector insulates individuals from the power of governmental and for-profit
organizations).
294. Kohler, supra note 20, at 299.
295. BARBARA CRUIKSHANK, THE WILL TO EMPOWER: DEMOCRATIC CITIZENS AND
OTHER SUBJECTS 3 (1999).
296. Kohler, supra note 20, at 297.
297. Kohler, supra note 20, at 300.
298. Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 5 (2000) (citing ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE
AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000)).
299. Estlund, supra note 298 at 4, 17.
300. Cf. Harold A. McDougall, Social Change Requires Civic Infrastructure, 56 HOW.
L.J. 801, 803 (2013) (arguing that civic infrastructure fills roles that governments and
corporations cannot).
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learning experience that, in practice, demonstrates how
organizing, mobilizing, and educating are all aspects of the same
effort. 301
But union success as seedbeds of civic virtue depends on unions being
democratic themselves. Either way, they educate their members, but the
lessons they teach may be very different. In undemocratic and autocratic
unions, “the message conveyed, sometimes brutally, sometimes subtly, is:
Sit down and shut up, and pay your dues. Don’t rock the boat.” 302 That is
not a message we should want union members taking with them into the
public sphere.
CONCLUSION
This article has compared the legal regulation of the internal
governance of publicly traded corporations with that of labor unions. It
began by asking whether unions and corporations are similar enough in
form and function to make such comparisons fruitful, and concluded that
the similarities are sufficiently strong to make the endeavor, at a minimum,
more valuable than comparisons between corporate governance and public
government. The article found that in some respects, union governance and
corporate governance are remarkably similar, while in other respects, the
differences are substantial. In the case of shareholder and union member
derivative suits, it observed that while the union member derivative suit
was specifically modeled on shareholder suits as they existed at the time
the LMRDA was enacted, the two causes of action have diverged
substantially since, with significant changes in the way shareholder
derivative suits proceed (or more likely, do not proceed at all). While it
was not the purpose of this article to recommend specific features of union
democracy law that should be imported into the corporate context, or vice
versa, it is hoped that scholars, policymakers, and practitioners in either
field can find some insights here that might be valuable in the other field as
well.
The article also explored the policy arguments for and against more
democracy in unions and in corporations and found the similarities striking,
at least with respect to instrumental arguments. However, while there are
also strong normative arguments supporting democracy in unions, the
arguments in favor of shareholder democracy are exclusively instrumental.
301. Jose La Luz, Education for Worker Empowerment, in AUDACIOUS DEMOCRACY:
LABOR, INTELLECTUALS, AND THE SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 85, 87 (Steven
Fraser & Joshua B. Freeman eds., 1997).
302. BENSON, supra note 36, at 213.
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Democracy in unions is closely related to the very purposes of collective
bargaining itself and plays an important role in making unions “seedbeds of
the civic virtues” in the larger political and social arena. Shareholder
democracy, on the other hand, is simply one tool among many in the
corporate governance toolbox that can be used to strike an appropriate
balance between board decision-making authority on the one hand, and the
need for board accountability on the other.

